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arxiv: 2605.23677 · v1 · pith:HRBECPBRnew · submitted 2026-05-22 · 💻 cs.DC

AMP: Arc Multi-Proposer Protocol with Bounded Inclusion Guarantees

Daniel Cason , Gordon Liao , Sergio Mena , Nenad Milo\v{s}evi\'c , Adi Seredinschi , Alessandro Sforzin , Jo\~ao Sousa , Preston Vander Vos This is my paper

Pith reviewed 2026-05-25 02:54 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💻 cs.DC
keywords multi-proposerblockchainTendermintpayload inclusionattestationdeterministic orderingvalidator power
0
0 comments X

The pith

AMP guarantees that payloads attested by all correct validators are included in the next block.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper introduces AMP as a multi-proposer protocol layered on Tendermint to limit the control any single validator exerts over transaction inclusion and ordering in blocks. Dedicated proposer nodes gather user transactions into payloads and send them to validators, who then attest to receipt and run consensus only on the set of payloads to include. The core mechanism ensures that a payload attested by every correct validator must appear in the following block, so each block aggregates payloads from several proposers. A deterministic ordering step is then applied to the contents of those payloads. This design separates transaction dissemination from agreement and removes unilateral validator power over what enters a block or how it is sequenced.

Core claim

When all correct validators attest to a given payload, AMP guarantees that payload will be included in the next block; a block thus contains payloads from multiple proposers, allowing for bulk finalization. This bounded inclusion guarantee along with a deterministic ordering algorithm which is run over all payloads included in a block, curbs the power of any single validator.

What carries the argument

The bounded inclusion guarantee that forces any payload attested by all correct validators into the next block, paired with a deterministic ordering algorithm applied to the selected payloads.

Load-bearing premise

Dedicated proposer nodes can be introduced and operated without creating new centralization, denial-of-service, or collusion vectors while the attestation-plus-consensus layer actually delivers the claimed inclusion guarantee under the base protocol's fault model.

What would settle it

Observe a payload that receives attestations from all correct validators yet is omitted from the next block produced by the protocol.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2605.23677 by Adi Seredinschi, Alessandro Sforzin, Daniel Cason, Gordon Liao, Jo\~ao Sousa, Nenad Milo\v{s}evi\'c, Preston Vander Vos, Sergio Mena.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: Architecture of a validator node. The AMP logic sits between the application and the underlying dissemination and agreement layers. Each pi represents a payload broadcast by a proposer and received by the validator. GetValue(h) returns a commit certificate to propose in the agreement layer; validators extract the decided set of payload ids from it. The Decided primitive also returns a commit certificate, r… view at source ↗
read the original abstract

Blockchain systems that settle financial transactions face a structural tension: the single validator that assembles each block holds unilateral power over transaction inclusion and ordering. Traditional markets curb this very power through front-running and market-manipulation laws. Regulators have flagged the absence of such rules as a first-order concern for blockchain-based financial infrastructure. In response, we introduce AMP, a multi-proposer protocol, on top of the Tendermint consensus algorithm, where no validator can control the flow of transactions into blocks. Instead, dedicated nodes called proposers sit between users and validators. They collect user transactions, group them into payloads, and broadcast the payloads to all validators. Consequently, there is no mempool, and AMP applies the design principle of separating dissemination from agreement, which can lead to higher throughput. Validators publicly attest to receiving payloads and run consensus to decide the set of payloads to include in the next block. When all correct validators attest to a given payload, AMP guarantees that payload will be included in the next block; a block thus contains payloads from multiple proposers, allowing for bulk finalization. This bounded inclusion guarantee along with a deterministic ordering algorithm which is run over all payloads included in a block, curbs the power of any single validator. Validators no longer control what is included in a block, nor can they arbitrarily order the contents of blocks.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

2 major / 1 minor

Summary. The paper introduces AMP, a multi-proposer protocol layered atop Tendermint consensus. Dedicated proposer nodes collect user transactions into payloads and broadcast them to validators; validators attest to received payloads and run consensus to select the set of payloads for the next block. The central claims are a bounded inclusion guarantee (any payload attested by all correct validators is included in the next block) and a deterministic ordering algorithm over included payloads that together eliminate single-validator control over transaction inclusion and ordering, while separating dissemination from agreement to improve throughput.

Significance. If the inclusion guarantee and ordering properties can be shown to hold under Tendermint's standard partial-synchrony and f < n/3 model, the work would directly address a recognized regulatory and market concern about validator power in financial blockchains. The separation of dissemination from agreement is a known design principle that can raise throughput; the multi-proposer structure with explicit inclusion bounds would be a concrete instantiation worth documenting.

major comments (2)
  1. [Abstract] Abstract: the bounded inclusion guarantee is asserted ('When all correct validators attest to a given payload, AMP guarantees that payload will be included in the next block') yet the manuscript supplies no description of the modified proposal or voting rules inside Tendermint that would enforce inclusion of every fully-attested payload rather than a proposer- or size-selected subset.
  2. [Abstract] Abstract: no pseudocode, protocol specification, proof sketch, or experimental evaluation is provided for either the inclusion guarantee or the deterministic ordering algorithm, so the central claims cannot be evaluated from the supplied text.
minor comments (1)
  1. The title contains 'Arc' but the abstract does not define or expand the acronym.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

2 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for the detailed review and constructive comments. The points raised correctly identify gaps in the current presentation of the protocol mechanisms and supporting material. We will prepare a major revision that supplies the missing descriptions, specifications, and analysis while preserving the core claims.

read point-by-point responses

  1. Referee: [Abstract] Abstract: the bounded inclusion guarantee is asserted ('When all correct validators attest to a given payload, AMP guarantees that payload will be included in the next block') yet the manuscript supplies no description of the modified proposal or voting rules inside Tendermint that would enforce inclusion of every fully-attested payload rather than a proposer- or size-selected subset.

    Authors: We agree that the abstract states the guarantee without explaining the concrete changes to Tendermint's proposal and voting phases that enforce it. The full manuscript contains a high-level description of attestation and payload selection, but does not yet spell out the precise modifications to the proposal message format or the voting rule that prioritizes fully-attested payloads. In the revision we will add an explicit subsection (and corresponding abstract sentence) that defines the modified proposal rule (payloads are proposed only if attested by a quorum) and the voting rule (validators vote for the maximal set of attested payloads that fit the block size, with a deterministic tie-breaker). This will show why a fully-attested payload cannot be omitted in favor of a proposer- or size-selected subset. revision: yes

  2. Referee: [Abstract] Abstract: no pseudocode, protocol specification, proof sketch, or experimental evaluation is provided for either the inclusion guarantee or the deterministic ordering algorithm, so the central claims cannot be evaluated from the supplied text.

    Authors: The observation is accurate for the current version: the abstract and main text assert the two properties but supply neither pseudocode nor a proof sketch. The full manuscript does contain an informal argument for the inclusion guarantee under the standard partial-synchrony and f < n/3 model, yet it lacks formal pseudocode, a compact proof outline, and any experimental data. In the revision we will insert (i) Algorithm boxes for payload dissemination, attestation, and the deterministic ordering procedure, (ii) a short proof sketch showing that any payload attested by all correct validators is selected in the next consensus round, and (iii) a preliminary performance section with throughput and inclusion-latency measurements on a small testbed. These additions will make the claims directly evaluable. revision: yes

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No circularity; protocol claims are definitional but not self-referential

full rationale

The manuscript presents a protocol description and states an inclusion guarantee as a direct property of the AMP design layered on Tendermint. No equations, fitted parameters, predictions derived from subsets of data, or load-bearing self-citations appear. The guarantee is asserted from the protocol rules rather than reduced to a quantity defined in terms of itself. The derivation chain is therefore self-contained against the listed circularity patterns.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 1 axioms · 2 invented entities

The central claim rests on the introduction of new node roles (proposers) and an attestation mechanism whose correctness is asserted without independent verification in the abstract; the only explicit background assumption is that Tendermint's safety and liveness properties continue to hold.

axioms (1)
  • domain assumption Tendermint consensus provides safety and liveness under its standard partial-synchrony and fault assumptions
    The protocol is explicitly built on top of Tendermint as stated in the abstract.
invented entities (2)
  • Proposers no independent evidence
    purpose: Dedicated nodes that collect user transactions, form payloads, and broadcast them to validators
    New architectural role introduced to separate dissemination from agreement.
  • Payloads no independent evidence
    purpose: Bundled transaction sets that are attested and selected for inclusion
    Core data unit of the new dissemination layer.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5801 in / 1438 out tokens · 32899 ms · 2026-05-25T02:54:58.676789+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

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