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Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Competing Bandits in Matching Markets

As of 20 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 0 of 0 outbound references and 2 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:1906.05363.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
1906.05363 v2

Coverage vector

measured 0 of 0 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 2 of 2 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00

measured 2 of 2 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-10T22:11:42.579302Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: arxiv_reference, observed 2026-05-24T08:44:14.239413Z

Reference resolution

0 of 0 outbound references displayed

  • verified exact0
  • verified fuzzy0
  • unresolved0
  • parse uncertain0
  • malformed identifier0
  • metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

No outbound reference observations are available for this paper version.

Pith citing papers

Observation 459988f2-3aa9-403c-87a6-ff83a804a29c · inbound

Near-Optimal Privacy-Preserving Learning for Max-Min Fair Multi-Agent Bandits cites this paper.

Near-Optimal Privacy-Preserving Learning for Max-Min Fair Multi-Agent Bandits Competing Bandits in Matching Markets

Reference 7

Resolution
verified exact
arxiv_id, observed 2026-05-24T08:44:14.242339Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-05-24T08:41:17.836280Z digest=sha256:3d409cb21df97eec071cc7d55e4340c42ff0f5d1a6e75fa6229314eda5c7af98

Observation ded7636c-ad5d-441f-803c-15c4463e1e4c · inbound

Probably Correct Optimal Stable Matching for Two-Sided Markets Under Uncertainty cites this paper.

Probably Correct Optimal Stable Matching for Two-Sided Markets Under Uncertainty Competing Bandits in Matching Markets

Reference 15

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T22:11:42.579302Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T22:11:42.579302Z digest=sha256:9ae9e1121d36ad6635e083d7aa741b7bbc8ea837f6c1703d93adef5d0bc948f3