Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links
Paper Citation Record · LEDGER
Taming the Exponential Action Set: Sublinear Regret and Fast Convergence to Nash Equilibrium in Online Congestion Games
As of 24 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 0 of 0 outbound references and 3 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2306.13673.
A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.
Coverage vector
One-hop event checks from named stored sources.
Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-23T06:30:58.430688+00:00
Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-15T20:53:52.070711Z
A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.
Source: arxiv_reference, observed 2026-05-12T06:56:31.555830Z
Reference resolution
0 of 0 outbound references displayed
- verified exact0
- verified fuzzy0
- unresolved0
- parse uncertain0
- malformed identifier0
- metadata mismatch0
External citation measurements
No source-named external measurement is stored.
Outbound references
No outbound reference observations are available for this paper version.
Pith citing papers
Observation 286b3b15-2379-4132-8433-eb9712026e94 · inbound
Robustness of Incentive Mechanisms Against System Misspecification in Congestion Games cites this paper.
Robustness of Incentive Mechanisms Against System Misspecification in Congestion Games Taming the Exponential Action Set: Sublinear Regret and Fast Convergence to Nash Equilibrium in Online Congestion Games
Reference 12
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T20:53:52.070711Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation bc189787-63c0-407e-9766-a7be2e5f0be0 · inbound
Computing Equilibria in Games with Stochastic Action Sets cites this paper.
Computing Equilibria in Games with Stochastic Action Sets Taming the Exponential Action Set: Sublinear Regret and Fast Convergence to Nash Equilibrium in Online Congestion Games
Reference 581
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-02T22:47:31.248035Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 639ad530-8d8f-4c20-b829-1a23bb693006 · inbound
Near-Optimal Last-Iterate Convergence for Zero-Sum Games with Bandit Feedback and Opponent Actions cites this paper.
Near-Optimal Last-Iterate Convergence for Zero-Sum Games with Bandit Feedback and Opponent Actions Taming the Exponential Action Set: Sublinear Regret and Fast Convergence to Nash Equilibrium in Online Congestion Games
Reference 121
- Resolution
- verified exact
- arxiv_id, observed 2026-05-12T06:56:31.559247Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-23T06:30:58.430688+00:00.