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Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

On the Limitations and Possibilities of Nash Regret Minimization in Zero-Sum Matrix Games under Noisy Feedback

As of 8 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 0 of 0 outbound references and 2 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2306.13233.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2306.13233 v3

Coverage vector

measured 0 of 0 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 2 of 2 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00

measured 2 of 2 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:57.238622Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: arxiv_reference, observed 2026-05-25T05:30:22.920064Z

Reference resolution

0 of 0 outbound references displayed

  • verified exact0
  • verified fuzzy0
  • unresolved0
  • parse uncertain0
  • malformed identifier0
  • metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

No outbound reference observations are available for this paper version.

Pith citing papers

Observation ea1f350f-e5be-44dd-9dd4-09217f4cc620 · inbound

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals cites this paper.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals On the Limitations and Possibilities of Nash Regret Minimization in Zero-Sum Matrix Games under Noisy Feedback

Reference 24

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:57.238622Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-07T13:03:57.238622Z digest=sha256:d99eb8d709385cd57b0362b76ea0fb17bd14395b5616eae5624f1d1e0b1e80a7

Observation ce63a9ce-a487-4d98-a195-29e9198cf183 · inbound

Prudent-Banker: No Extra Fees for Baseline Safety in Adversarial Bandits With and Without Delays cites this paper.

Prudent-Banker: No Extra Fees for Baseline Safety in Adversarial Bandits With and Without Delays On the Limitations and Possibilities of Nash Regret Minimization in Zero-Sum Matrix Games under Noisy Feedback

Reference 46

Resolution
verified exact
arxiv_id, observed 2026-05-25T05:30:22.922917Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-05-25T05:28:04.999708Z digest=sha256:9d3c27d75d8ed5a40875dc5a50f17cce327cd851abaacc5ac0cac75fb0c23850