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Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Estimating and Incentivizing Imperfect-Knowledge Agents with Hidden Rewards

As of 8 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 0 of 0 outbound references and 2 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2308.06717.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2308.06717 v1

Coverage vector

measured 0 of 0 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 2 of 2 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00

measured 2 of 2 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:55.914058Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: arxiv_reference, observed 2026-05-11T15:21:06.800294Z

Reference resolution

0 of 0 outbound references displayed

  • verified exact0
  • verified fuzzy0
  • unresolved0
  • parse uncertain0
  • malformed identifier0
  • metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

No outbound reference observations are available for this paper version.

Pith citing papers

Observation e6bfac6a-ee86-4ec2-b333-2015fa4f6c22 · inbound

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals cites this paper.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Estimating and Incentivizing Imperfect-Knowledge Agents with Hidden Rewards

Reference 8

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:55.914058Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-07T13:03:55.914058Z digest=sha256:3d442c7ee0f3a2fc7755d4ac66b074fd8aae8510089e8bd438f6da4e9eb9dd1e

Observation ea12b6f2-fde3-43e4-a852-5815ee0e8dd9 · inbound

Moral Hazard in LTI Dynamics: A Hypothesis Testing Approach cites this paper.

Moral Hazard in LTI Dynamics: A Hypothesis Testing Approach Estimating and Incentivizing Imperfect-Knowledge Agents with Hidden Rewards

Reference 12

Resolution
verified exact
arxiv_id, observed 2026-05-11T15:21:06.807552Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-05-09T20:15:18.228239Z digest=sha256:5d655af9e1e23a91dbb9eb093a235583fcbaa1d2b056c7bcea0f55d64201df4a