AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games | Paper Citation Record

Observation 708c23ab-6cfc-4711-b0a5-ae613a364b89 · outbound

This paper cites Poker, chance and skill.Unpublished Manuscript, pages 1–17, 2007.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Poker, chance and skill.Unpublished Manuscript, pages 1–17, 2007

Reference 1

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.495447Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 41526a7d-3b9d-49a0-9100-9cb3a2424225 · outbound

This paper cites A tool for the direct assessment of poker decisions.ICGA Journal, 29(3):119–142, 2006.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games A tool for the direct assessment of poker decisions.ICGA Journal, 29(3):119–142, 2006

Reference 2

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.488071Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation e3d4012d-e31f-4aa6-b5c1-fcff06c94058 · outbound

This paper cites Strategy evaluation in extensive games with importance sampling.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Strategy evaluation in extensive games with importance sampling

Reference 3

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.480555Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 99a8b830-521d-4fb4-8fac-0348ccefcf61 · outbound

This paper cites Heads-up limit hold’em poker is solved.Science, 347(6218):145–149, 2015.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Heads-up limit hold’em poker is solved.Science, 347(6218):145–149, 2015

Reference 4

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.472341Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation a13974b0-7182-44c6-adb2-39cd95c90460 · outbound

This paper cites Regret-based pruning in extensive-form games.Advances in neural information processing systems, 28, 2015.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Regret-based pruning in extensive-form games.Advances in neural information processing systems, 28, 2015

Reference 5

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.463630Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation ca2f72de-a313-4d16-b9c9-68b38217540a · outbound

This paper cites Baby tartanian8: Winning agent from the 2016 annual computer poker competition.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Baby tartanian8: Winning agent from the 2016 annual computer poker competition

Reference 6

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.455832Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 8a814adb-dea2-4782-a7ec-4978dc80b6db · outbound

This paper cites Strategy-based warm starting for regret minimization in games.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Strategy-based warm starting for regret minimization in games

Reference 7

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.447208Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 8ec0f197-ccfc-443b-a912-8f799e08ce9d · outbound

This paper cites Reduced space and faster convergence in imperfect- information games via pruning.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Reduced space and faster convergence in imperfect- information games via pruning

Reference 8

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.439308Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation c584a76e-970a-4991-9483-ae86c67cddcb · outbound

This paper cites Safe and nested subgame solving for imperfect-information games.Advances in neural information processing systems, 30, 2017.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Safe and nested subgame solving for imperfect-information games.Advances in neural information processing systems, 30, 2017

Reference 9

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.430919Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 76368856-b389-48cb-aabb-f26030bcd7ed · outbound

This paper cites Superhuman ai for heads-up no-limit poker: Libratus beats top professionals.Science, 359(6374):418–424, 2018.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Superhuman ai for heads-up no-limit poker: Libratus beats top professionals.Science, 359(6374):418–424, 2018

Reference 10

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:28.829714Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation d8a29b6c-3a81-4955-8721-bebc31f30387 · outbound

This paper cites Solving imperfect-information games via discounted regret minimization.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Solving imperfect-information games via discounted regret minimization

Reference 11

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.417975Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation a1e059f2-6ecd-46bd-a62e-21f7b8acac22 · outbound

This paper cites Superhuman ai for multiplayer poker.Science, 365(6456): 885–890, 2019.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Superhuman ai for multiplayer poker.Science, 365(6456): 885–890, 2019

Reference 12

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.409358Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation df4a5af5-4743-4ad6-9fba-16209e96d5a5 · outbound

This paper cites Depth-limited solving for imperfect- information games.Advances in neural information processing systems, 31, 2018.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Depth-limited solving for imperfect- information games.Advances in neural information processing systems, 31, 2018

Reference 13

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.401266Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation bbfdd051-e858-44e7-8072-d6c9295fedf0 · outbound

This paper cites Deep counterfactual regret minimization.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Deep counterfactual regret minimization

Reference 14

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:28.840841Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation c6659f64-9937-451f-8f14-53d3a6b81102 · outbound

This paper cites Combining deep reinforcement learning and search for imperfect-information games.Advances in neural information processing systems, 33:17057–17069, 2020.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Combining deep reinforcement learning and search for imperfect-information games.Advances in neural information processing systems, 33:17057–17069, 2020

Reference 15

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.387912Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 1be2092f-f225-420b-a4db-46e7ebc40d74 · outbound

This paper cites Aivat: A new variance reduction technique for agent evaluation in imperfect information games.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Aivat: A new variance reduction technique for agent evaluation in imperfect information games

Reference 16

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.380460Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 3ec714b1-20a1-48c1-997f-c47ba0b6d348 · outbound

This paper cites Baseline: practical control variates for agent evaluation in zero-sum domains.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Baseline: practical control variates for agent evaluation in zero-sum domains

Reference 17

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.372661Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 6ceed0dd-06fb-4ef6-8d96-170b277a9776 · outbound

This paper cites Low-variance and zero-variance baselines for extensive-form games.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Low-variance and zero-variance baselines for extensive-form games

Reference 18

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.365749Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 3cb174b4-4c26-4dc5-a2e4-799f8c69b886 · outbound

This paper cites Poker is a skill.Gaming Law Review, 12(1): 31–36, 2008.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Poker is a skill.Gaming Law Review, 12(1): 31–36, 2008

Reference 19

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.358432Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 69ffb719-43dd-4b42-b927-67ad467e368b · outbound

This paper cites Actor-critic policy optimization in a large-scale imperfect-information game.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Actor-critic policy optimization in a large-scale imperfect-information game

Reference 20

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.350916Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 144e92f6-b72e-4619-b8bc-d3cb11725fac · outbound

This paper cites Endgame solving in large imperfect-information games.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Endgame solving in large imperfect-information games

Reference 21

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.342845Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation da52eced-d438-4c5e-9d46-e8409fda79df · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Unresolved cited work

Reference 22

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.335593Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 1a00e521-7e63-43ee-bede-d7b547e9f36e · outbound

This paper cites Time-uniform, nonparametric, nonasymptotic confidence sequences.The Annals of Statistics, 49(2):1055–1080, 2021.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Time-uniform, nonparametric, nonasymptotic confidence sequences.The Annals of Statistics, 49(2):1055–1080, 2021

Reference 23

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.328296Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 77eaa26a-a994-4752-b08b-252cd7581253 · outbound

This paper cites Slumbot nl: Solving large games with counterfactual regret minimization using sampling and distributed processing.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Slumbot nl: Solving large games with counterfactual regret minimization using sampling and distributed processing

Reference 24

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.321025Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 1cd48736-1b37-46db-bfb4-2fc2ae394577 · outbound

This paper cites Measuring the Size of Large No-Limit Poker Games.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Measuring the Size of Large No-Limit Poker Games

Reference 25

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.124110Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 99499913-ddbf-4b60-8230-07e120f047d7 · outbound

This paper cites Accelerating best response calculation in large extensive games.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Accelerating best response calculation in large extensive games

Reference 26

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.313313Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation bcba6f34-5881-4681-a124-68d8195eb097 · outbound

This paper cites Evaluating state-space abstractions in extensive-form games.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Evaluating state-space abstractions in extensive-form games

Reference 27

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.305377Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 2a9dbcf0-7d7a-4d29-ad90-07d5e2824438 · outbound

This paper cites Postgame analysis of poker decisions.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Postgame analysis of poker decisions

Reference 28

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.296506Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 147c655a-e0ae-4b18-bbc1-0b8a3a5446e6 · outbound

This paper cites Heuristic Pathologies and Further Variance Reduction via Uncertainty Propagation in the AIVAT Family of Techniques.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Heuristic Pathologies and Further Variance Reduction via Uncertainty Propagation in the AIVAT Family of Techniques

Reference 29

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.111697Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation a07de20c-8b0d-4e97-bfba-2247fe14f073 · outbound

This paper cites Value func- tions for depth-limited solving in zero-sum imperfect-information games.Artificial Intelligence, 314:103805, 2023.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Value func- tions for depth-limited solving in zero-sum imperfect-information games.Artificial Intelligence, 314:103805, 2023

Reference 30

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.288415Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation ff06dcc8-6d8a-4d94-bace-0408d7a916b8 · outbound

This paper cites Monte carlo sampling for regret minimization in extensive games.Advances in neural information processing systems, 22, 2009.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Monte carlo sampling for regret minimization in extensive games.Advances in neural information processing systems, 22, 2009

Reference 31

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.279877Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 1e25bdf9-18dd-40f9-89fe-4d50d95ffbf1 · outbound

This paper cites Efficient online pruning and abstraction for imperfect information extensive-form games.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Efficient online pruning and abstraction for imperfect information extensive-form games

Reference 32

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.271813Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 0f0f2526-e08b-4021-9e92-d478edb4d6cd · outbound

This paper cites Agents that certify their own exploits: Confidence-scheduled restricted responses for safe opponent exploitation, 2026.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Agents that certify their own exploits: Confidence-scheduled restricted responses for safe opponent exploitation, 2026

Reference 33

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.263529Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation a3330ebc-25fe-405e-9891-a1ea39baa2c9 · outbound

This paper cites Effective, Efficient, and General Information Abstraction for Imperfect-Information Extensive-Form Games.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Effective, Efficient, and General Information Abstraction for Imperfect-Information Extensive-Form Games

Reference 34

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:28.893409Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 7b8c89c5-b773-4737-97ea-e38d2434bcb4 · outbound

This paper cites Real-Time Parallel Counterfactual Regret Minimization.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Real-Time Parallel Counterfactual Regret Minimization

Reference 35

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.090684Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 422c9625-eca8-4019-948f-3cdba0e9d534 · outbound

This paper cites Rl-cfr: improving action abstraction for imperfect information extensive-form games with reinforcement learning.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Rl-cfr: improving action abstraction for imperfect information extensive-form games with reinforcement learning

Reference 36

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.255317Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 3fa5cc88-6f28-497c-8be2-8d8eef14557e · outbound

This paper cites Correlated Chance Sampling for Monte Carlo Counterfactual Regret Minimization.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Correlated Chance Sampling for Monte Carlo Counterfactual Regret Minimization

Reference 37

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.079025Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation cbad13a0-ccb2-45f6-9d0c-15bbe9b19c32 · outbound

This paper cites PokerSkill: LLMs Can Play Expert-Level Poker without Training or Solvers.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games PokerSkill: LLMs Can Play Expert-Level Poker without Training or Solvers

Reference 38

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.066824Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 813922aa-6c97-473f-b77d-c24f4803ece5 · outbound

This paper cites Escher: Eschewing importance sampling in games by computing a history value function to estimate regret.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Escher: Eschewing importance sampling in games by computing a history value function to estimate regret

Reference 39

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.247002Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 25767b75-4d81-4af6-a8f5-df0d7ea9fabf · outbound

This paper cites Refining subgames in large imperfect information games.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Refining subgames in large imperfect information games

Reference 40

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.238326Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation f7206943-eadb-4536-89c1-37b6fce03194 · outbound

This paper cites Deepstack: Expert-level artificial intelligence in heads-up no-limit poker.Science, 356(6337):508–513, 2017.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Deepstack: Expert-level artificial intelligence in heads-up no-limit poker.Science, 356(6337):508–513, 2017

Reference 41

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.230487Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation d0e0091c-ba4f-4399-a292-59bbcac4ec33 · outbound

This paper cites Gto wizard benchmark.arXiv preprint arXiv:2603.23660, 2026.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Gto wizard benchmark.arXiv preprint arXiv:2603.23660, 2026

Reference 42

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:28.916993Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation f0cdc202-4205-4005-95ba-ed323d693bd9 · outbound

This paper cites Game-theoretic statistics and safe anytime-valid inference.Statistical Science, 38(4):576–601, 2023.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Game-theoretic statistics and safe anytime-valid inference.Statistical Science, 38(4):576–601, 2023

Reference 43

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:28.919868Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 6be04c56-d971-4c88-b5d3-e5dba1e37893 · outbound

This paper cites Variance reduction in monte carlo counterfactual regret minimization (vr-mccfr) for extensive form games using baselines.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Variance reduction in monte carlo counterfactual regret minimization (vr-mccfr) for extensive form games using baselines

Reference 44

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.216490Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 05149767-4d38-4e7f-9abc-e5d9124759f4 · outbound

This paper cites Student of games: A unified learning algorithm for both perfect and imperfect information games.Science Advances, 9(46):eadg3256, 2023.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Student of games: A unified learning algorithm for both perfect and imperfect information games.Science Advances, 9(46):eadg3256, 2023

Reference 45

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.207327Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 903767b3-83cb-48d1-afa5-5a3493051a5b · outbound

This paper cites Solving Large Imperfect Information Games Using CFR+.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Solving Large Imperfect Information Games Using CFR+

Reference 46

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:28.928918Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation c5c4234e-3ed4-4cc8-8b5d-cbf4a2af41ae · outbound

This paper cites Time- uniform central limit theory and asymptotic confidence sequences.The Annals of Statistics, 52 (6), 2024.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Time- uniform central limit theory and asymptotic confidence sequences.The Annals of Statistics, 52 (6), 2024

Reference 47

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.198458Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 89b07f1e-d4f8-4709-8cda-af55396d22f0 · outbound

This paper cites Abstraction pathologies in extensive games.AAMAS (2), 2009:781–8, 2009.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Abstraction pathologies in extensive games.AAMAS (2), 2009:781–8, 2009

Reference 48

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.189635Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 1d9cc55b-ecf6-4caf-b411-7abb365cc30d · outbound

This paper cites Learning a value analysis tool for agent evaluation.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Learning a value analysis tool for agent evaluation

Reference 49

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.180184Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 49bea0bd-26a4-4176-99e8-f2d95faf6907 · outbound

This paper cites Douzero: Mastering doudizhu with self-play deep reinforcement learning.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Douzero: Mastering doudizhu with self-play deep reinforcement learning

Reference 50

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:28.940308Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 7c426a15-73f5-4a84-918f-8577d42101f9 · outbound

This paper cites Pokerbench: Training large language models to become professional poker players.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Pokerbench: Training large language models to become professional poker players

Reference 51

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.165757Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 2dae36a5-254a-4bd9-aad9-de0d4bc644d1 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal unbiased estimators for evaluating agent performance.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Optimal unbiased estimators for evaluating agent performance

Reference 52

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.157429Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 9f18a685-c36a-4c03-b4de-0c9ddbd3512c · outbound

This paper cites Regret mini- mization in games with incomplete information.Advances in neural information processing systems, 20, 2007.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Regret mini- mization in games with incomplete information.Advances in neural information processing systems, 20, 2007

Reference 53

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.148931Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation 220f8510-b8c8-46a5-ac66-0330723a7775 · outbound

This paper cites Contain” means that the interval still contains zero at the monitor’s selected stop; “Asymp FP.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Contain” means that the interval still contains zero at the monitor’s selected stop; “Asymp FP

Reference 54

Resolution: malformed identifier; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.141244Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Observation d1d62d44-6b11-4a9b-a5cf-1d56fbdbd456 · outbound

This paper cites Frozen and oracle corrected streams are identical in this matched control, so there is no identifiable oracle variance gap.

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games Frozen and oracle corrected streams are identical in this matched control, so there is no identifiable oracle variance gap

Reference 55

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T04:22:29.132837Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-19T06:32:44.657259+00:00.

Coverage vector

Reference resolution

Outbound references

Pith citing papers