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Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information

As of 8 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 100 of 131 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2607.08675.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2607.08675 v1

Coverage vector

measured 100 of 131 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z

measured 100 of 100 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00

measured 0 of 0 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: cited_works

Reference resolution

100 of 131 outbound references displayed

  • verified exact10
  • verified fuzzy85
  • unresolved4
  • parse uncertain0
  • malformed identifier0
  • metadata mismatch1

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation 269758ae-2dd1-4b45-a40c-2452cb982e50 · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Review , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Review , volume=

Reference 1

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.249416Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:67d1ef51a32fa064fe26572241799ba80d91b9043f0093f639743df6ee0776ef

Observation c0416f84-b476-45d6-b9bb-8c3d4f93980c · outbound

This paper cites Annual Review of Economics , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Annual Review of Economics , volume=

Reference 2

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.210186Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:d7e874c3b750e33bfe89e7412028bafc790fa86ee6eeb3d163510d5869864609

Observation ed501ad4-417a-4a88-9323-5deb9f845935 · outbound

This paper cites Sequential Bayesian persuasion , journal =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Sequential Bayesian persuasion , journal =

Reference 3

Resolution
verified exact
arxiv_id, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.040492Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:3ba44d776c6e8dc9b7d55cc8f4872025006b1b2d58624a100ab17a28aff05939

Observation d0ab801b-ceba-4ee8-8ccb-cce4260e1579 · outbound

This paper cites SIGecom Exch.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information SIGecom Exch

Reference 4

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.356976Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:a913a9c68565f016df4777b44a1a580cc508660b4589aa43ba10e3da5dc04174

Observation 44a5ec49-4286-41c9-833a-bbdee88631ba · outbound

This paper cites Persuading Voters , urldate =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Persuading Voters , urldate =

Reference 5

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.301670Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:f563ec1f53f7e205d0267dd64717578ecd97a5b75f4efcd313ffd9dc8acd9a1b

Observation b07d4346-73e3-497a-b337-c6f06239d58a · outbound

This paper cites Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver , journal =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver , journal =

Reference 6

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.382561Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:0615e33ec492fdad0dc5f441e258ce0824f03db6f98c917928989e0cdb2d769d

Observation 5dc1e702-775f-4866-b622-f9c95fcb7f20 · outbound

This paper cites Unpublished manuscript, London School Econ , year=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Unpublished manuscript, London School Econ , year=

Reference 7

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.287671Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:875ae965f6911d491677c49108c0313f2e191b1be37db97ff336d63ae56d1fa1

Observation f261443c-5266-4225-a4cf-6d3162c18551 · outbound

This paper cites Private Bayesian persuasion , journal =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Private Bayesian persuasion , journal =

Reference 8

Resolution
verified exact
doi, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.028968Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:5f289488dc5dbead5fe86c7182faf946f21a0d7347a96f16ebf5d0a987930ddc

Observation b6cc78ab-f660-463a-89d7-693129400dba · outbound

This paper cites SIGecom Exch.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information SIGecom Exch

Reference 9

Resolution
verified exact
arxiv_id, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.023864Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:e0302bb04cdc54b331b14478675a1e0c37bda67db01792d12b872cdd26c7e121

Observation 09273fbc-9231-4052-b605-c71c0827e382 · outbound

This paper cites 2024 , eprint=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 2024 , eprint=

Reference 10

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.217745Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:9a1a83b66682297968610489c9aa63c2efb3ee1dd1bdca14daaafbb78fc8f5f5

Observation 126ee8a0-e1f1-45e3-b2ee-5aca460a40ce · outbound

This paper cites AEA Papers and Proceedings , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information AEA Papers and Proceedings , volume=

Reference 11

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.219451Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:30623cafd650fad44ff9763d0460f082bafa50ebbf6be9a7328bcdd9f3d52223

Observation b0911afd-e16b-4e4a-858f-df038a7c22cd · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economics & Management Strategy , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economics & Management Strategy , volume=

Reference 12

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.231947Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:4a10a5b1f64a8014a04f8e82b93f3d00ab2b448e9ca37d1d3193be9558f750a1

Observation a2d33a90-4dba-4f5f-99f5-12808a8745f0 · outbound

This paper cites Theoretical Economics , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Theoretical Economics , volume=

Reference 13

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.303631Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:0dcaa18e7102f81529ecd523b4bb849b31f6ae98cdd30c6e867054553070862f

Observation 7c87f370-bc5e-43a5-b5ce-3f9940a2cb7a · outbound

This paper cites 2020 , journal=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 2020 , journal=

Reference 14

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.230254Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:be58594a110b8903bf16f807a6f9413372a78f39a4513267b676decbd546f6fc

Observation d57e3d0a-a632-4585-b9c5-244e30b02692 · outbound

This paper cites 1926 , publisher=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 1926 , publisher=

Reference 15

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.372802Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:3bf5f034737c72b252a8201c1016cdca807503f7416889f3099dde05dd652b6c

Observation 37945355-6b15-4584-9578-d5ef3e2f7888 · outbound

This paper cites Theoretical Economics , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Theoretical Economics , volume=

Reference 16

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.315655Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:c6ac651375e1ff647f58082bef7ea4faac60a1d77101af4e4a7195b5db4aec50

Observation 25298947-3c68-461f-a880-3c0ee3389d27 · outbound

This paper cites International Journal of Game Theory , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information International Journal of Game Theory , volume=

Reference 17

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.292768Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:a1558c43974f661adc77fcb49a8373fad7e856e51b5542178cb3bb8459d20c2d

Observation 7b34ddcd-d641-4f76-adc0-f17c2488670c · outbound

This paper cites Available at SSRN 4531654 , year=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Available at SSRN 4531654 , year=

Reference 18

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.317794Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:db35ccace8e285fd75bd3cb866aa34597689860763f28bb1525bfbd6486d320b

Observation 1ed10c57-1d64-48e0-99f8-6c36d52c89b2 · outbound

This paper cites Games and Economic Behavior , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Games and Economic Behavior , volume=

Reference 19

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.396836Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:f6e872ddab25d5a801d4833404c7d297e7d4ccbaf4815b0b0b7ede8efd64ed08

Observation 258ffa6a-0b82-485d-b85f-ba0eba759fae · outbound

This paper cites Mathematische Annalen , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Mathematische Annalen , volume=

Reference 20

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.299908Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:6f79a9eed1ddf940af2dc1fed4e7b057edbffcd03d6865f15d6e69b7eaeff363

Observation 13ecef49-627f-4715-a4fb-c4d2b7fb5d28 · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Review , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Review , volume=

Reference 21

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.312445Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:9fcf224e22a976583610839b3279d11299c7d2b64aa8781d23c039167e7aaab6

Observation 56781092-fd66-4ef2-b743-3913fc3669e0 · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica , volume=

Reference 22

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.356186Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:836b7c7611c26632848f633eb5b31a74c35d02ed5c84bd274cb427fdf5312cb4

Observation 873a386d-5603-4a2e-aac9-8f26a5c83088 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economic Theory , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economic Theory , volume=

Reference 23

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.336374Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:658064d00d96bbfec0f0099b6f3e39d2208782ea900b7fce30a07ce663a244ba

Observation 9e1384f1-92e7-49f3-9ea6-9fc2177d6abb · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Political Economy , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Political Economy , volume=

Reference 24

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.328638Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:be551c34c1ba039be282c6144246ebddaea4caf64cc8d69e0f753dae8a09c3c9

Observation 4ca43506-26cc-42ec-b630-e8b5b0e16fc7 · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica , volume=

Reference 25

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.312128Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:78ed9cd9dc28f44daa694c8014e23cdd5d8f3e7b9ee554998407f023cc8cb5a6

Observation 162e4fc5-04c4-416e-b60e-f0bf62b1a4b6 · outbound

This paper cites Available at SSRN 3697335 , year=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Available at SSRN 3697335 , year=

Reference 26

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.337168Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:fd91c413d21397ed73bae55d9218e126716312c2ba4366258ff08607a3ff7d04

Observation 6b0bbad8-aa45-47c3-9426-f9bf649272d3 · outbound

This paper cites Bayesian Persuasion Meets Mechanism Design: Going Beyond Intractability with Type Reporting.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Bayesian Persuasion Meets Mechanism Design: Going Beyond Intractability with Type Reporting

Reference 27

Resolution
verified exact
local_arxiv, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.052868Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:9ca5ccb9bf02c9971df4158b00d1802af053a5cf9c4ca9670b1ff5dfead8abe2

Observation 14c71ff2-a48c-419b-bd29-dea5c0d4ee82 · outbound

This paper cites Preprint , title =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Preprint , title =

Reference 28

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.393444Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:7212ac229464f5cb637374919194a334eee9fc44be4918b63b66b62391ab1e5c

Observation cca4cb63-348b-4f1e-9b17-8d74ecd808d7 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economic Literature , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economic Literature , volume=

Reference 29

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.351879Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:c4bf43b8cd8ae9f5bc5e1261f7e0a00c332d8c406c7dcfc42c7d56bc59d3f5d2

Observation 2d7ead62-6662-48e7-8cbf-1a1a27b1ea97 · outbound

This paper cites 2022 , publisher=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 2022 , publisher=

Reference 30

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.366575Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:135690996b757c438584714a0313492aa851ec309f8d258381a95edf5e36af91

Observation 27c1d003-4a7a-4cb3-9da6-4afcce8b41ab · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica , volume=

Reference 31

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.378623Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:c172433eb9fff0d38091e14dfcef42ec7a63c7017c9642434978c583aa1d035a

Observation 78cbde6a-0cfa-45ad-9727-5fb7cd554eea · outbound

This paper cites Available at SSRN 3281132 , year=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Available at SSRN 3281132 , year=

Reference 32

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.291341Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:84b06834667341d29a877599ffef47c66a8c1d22644ae115ca4fafd868e5c335

Observation 0fdaf95b-10de-4878-bfe3-ecf25e6b4b74 · outbound

This paper cites Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality , urldate =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality , urldate =

Reference 33

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.269190Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:892fedcdd29f58d2d8c34ecf0a82e295b906caaa90a64a2bc768993ef89a4ff8

Observation 3c726076-83b7-4672-a424-40c94aeb73d4 · outbound

This paper cites Competing Persuaders in Zero-Sum Games.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Competing Persuaders in Zero-Sum Games

Reference 34

Resolution
metadata mismatch
local_arxiv, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.056350Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:f9f3dde0443fa6e8cc7481e2c0cded76aa787572248e19e9a5cdfaebd8b09968

Observation 40c635a9-6705-4422-8a58-00eef07d4e50 · outbound

This paper cites Games and Economic Behavior , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Games and Economic Behavior , volume=

Reference 35

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.301499Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:551af0db715c132d8aa27c50509c9a699f34d7163ccb610111d73b523738d131

Observation 58ccb820-7528-477c-acc2-78f4aa649ad9 · outbound

This paper cites The Review of Economic Studies , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information The Review of Economic Studies , volume=

Reference 36

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.339643Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:236a40e5fb8bf147bb8e719634afc9b6fc7a2e22a96b8795596c6b331a5c8eeb

Observation 680022ac-1e7a-4403-bc4e-8be9ad140016 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Political Economy , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Political Economy , volume=

Reference 37

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.357957Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:b8dd852a33a89a1a076ab5280cac7e5a8642a00d1b3e25c268723e4f9e007144

Observation f78f2098-d1cf-4a53-908f-c5b6c1a0fdb5 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Unresolved cited work

Reference 38

Resolution
unresolved
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.298295Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:8306508fc7870fb8a6567adeccd27ecb40bdb43aafda80ece5ade7a131c98195

Observation d0f4fbf6-8580-4066-9077-5dbbf222257a · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Mathematical Economics , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Mathematical Economics , volume=

Reference 39

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.246913Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:ef3164f1e3479dfacb17d7483f8d0d4ded623e99186b1a0a879cfe05c86ecf8f

Observation c593f02b-c09a-4e10-bf44-e1ff23322ae1 · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Journal: Microeconomics , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Journal: Microeconomics , volume=

Reference 40

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.279734Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:f6a40ac2a721f52e1c0d74e38672401075977d91257c501a51c847eea12f96fb

Observation 0b5c7719-00ef-4617-8ca0-b2d1b725ff9f · outbound

This paper cites 1970 , publisher=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 1970 , publisher=

Reference 41

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.224904Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:0de0c79f38e186910c052a7dab23c7a4144e9c7a1d0855cffc82aafe4cf2af15

Observation efbd5394-9fd6-44be-8133-1f2cc14c0ee3 · outbound

This paper cites Annals of Economics and Statistics , number=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Annals of Economics and Statistics , number=

Reference 42

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.264404Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:3c441cda280b218755fa0bc769217b8acb1d9fb31bdc4545111cea39ffbacebc

Observation 782fa419-8c45-4bf7-853b-7bebbfdcec75 · outbound

This paper cites The Review of Economic Studies , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information The Review of Economic Studies , volume=

Reference 43

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.305490Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:71ac0ddd1bc01cece1ce357c4887ba554c0e76ec937374e22cddce8103f2e5fc

Observation 3f1c5cb1-4d15-4af8-a74c-7df7890fd419 · outbound

This paper cites Working paper , year=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Working paper , year=

Reference 44

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.330219Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:8cf3cf50bfe8e6b6b35226a0d9f8e4076bb1ec9220c653d7d996975b08795aa9

Observation 8d66fc80-6cb8-4bbe-98ae-92956d7ebd64 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Political Economy , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Political Economy , volume=

Reference 45

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.326897Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:a61381861cc826391cef726208a0855c8dfc736fbaf61b883b544511faab9aa4

Observation 6c91dd42-5690-4b14-a56d-1e3306b74469 · outbound

This paper cites Theoretical Economics , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Theoretical Economics , volume=

Reference 46

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.298050Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:1ebbb6cbc884d9cd7202697e619a39e5828c3ea890731e990a82cef3a9767f95

Observation e918fa9d-e4e2-44a1-94a1-35e7c36672f9 · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica , volume=

Reference 47

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.319605Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:9071ae5495b89a43c81cc7ca524cc4946ffc6822ef6310f322bae0a5fff70f49

Observation 1a9dcfc0-447f-4854-9d0a-b7b18291d426 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economic Theory , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economic Theory , volume=

Reference 48

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.367574Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:16f67686025fc4edeab23bd5fae6c6cbc0378dd793eba0c128c0704eeb8e2ddd

Observation 081f2e4f-dac9-4753-935d-4bbff08e5ebe · outbound

This paper cites Theoretical Economics , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Theoretical Economics , volume=

Reference 49

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.368257Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:48b665e4cbe16b287bd371069db2874f6d326079c88424e322efadcbc4dd6c40

Observation ec6c288e-8f29-4719-ac75-2eef532795dc · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Unresolved cited work

Reference 50

Resolution
unresolved
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.376928Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:ea46f495d940e581da0beb800c7639685f1473d7f694a8449edf41bd02e0ad34

Observation 4e043450-34b9-425c-8ddb-d8afbfefcb96 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Unresolved cited work

Reference 51

Resolution
unresolved
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.353446Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:446c86d76fdb8e1dc0fa949c4009d8ebff0998489b64f5a030306686b580467e

Observation af33ed4c-db2d-4c83-bf68-0e291f55d16d · outbound

This paper cites The American Economic Review , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information The American Economic Review , year =

Reference 52

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.331860Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:9ec3135a0bb964d9828f53bd05d9d8c006b0a8e9fef46ec77735472fb81324ac

Observation d3ad39bf-b0a1-42c1-ade9-69720645bcd0 · outbound

This paper cites The Journal of Law & Economics , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information The Journal of Law & Economics , year =

Reference 53

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.345963Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:b4fde11fb7ca2d13fc8e0aecaecc82fe1ccb9f4280773919e5780fbe298c008e

Observation 64f009c7-9969-463a-95f4-d3f772c31975 · outbound

This paper cites and Dubra, Juan , title =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information and Dubra, Juan , title =

Reference 54

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.310849Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:98955038084a0bb457f57a19e4897811e43f4f376b7ca9af85cdd6c72dd9f2e2

Observation 117c3760-6e67-45d6-97d0-f8793bcbb550 · outbound

This paper cites Accounting Horizons , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Accounting Horizons , year =

Reference 55

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.292966Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:b6499ef83c2fa175b133740bf47da0e90a89792fca96a38317d634c4d8ce8db7

Observation 3c270756-d79f-4cba-bd2a-40026a87d9f7 · outbound

This paper cites The Accounting Review , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information The Accounting Review , year =

Reference 56

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.273276Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:4f2feff0feffb0b90a94cb53929db80d6d58ad48338982fca0bc455211ade784

Observation 3b42f996-6056-4a04-8ece-cd9462d60328 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economic Theory , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economic Theory , volume=

Reference 57

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.355237Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:36a45170bcf6348d23bae0844c521cc62024ba6dcbe1603a98517f68320da22b

Observation 8b75932a-f497-4ccd-8e0d-483c6f46042a · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Conflict Resolution , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Conflict Resolution , year =

Reference 58

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.358874Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:efdc233c68f9f884fb2a3024d923f97cc05978f67d6851efeafbeb03af6104af

Observation d1a01b5c-4bf9-4372-87cb-aa2527f21420 · outbound

This paper cites American Journal of Political Science , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Journal of Political Science , year =

Reference 59

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.310524Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:d54a5166967d12a4536d50fbce0647a86c1da13ef5f4266158d9be8c69856562

Observation a15811cc-38dc-47d7-8bf7-07bbc2dbacd6 · outbound

This paper cites Political Behavior , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Political Behavior , year =

Reference 60

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.332696Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:d3ccb42e11904c1512d481ca49183e55e300adb06e0415f14cc8f770ee69635b

Observation 95c1706d-1ca3-4e57-a77d-3dce64dc9d7c · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Marketing Communications , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Marketing Communications , year =

Reference 61

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.247339Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:000965e7033991d308331fb7d7b4d13fc8f8605272ca44f6ab371ac581a51dea

Observation 21697ab0-362c-4e52-b801-16a019a81d0b · outbound

This paper cites American Political Science Review , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Political Science Review , year =

Reference 62

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.364908Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:cd7af5646d690775fc5ced6b1dc533c5b0836c9a06a60e8b9182a78e6a0f5a70

Observation 77395c00-3ff9-447f-ba6a-fb41ae246d26 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Applied Social Psychology , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Applied Social Psychology , year =

Reference 63

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.268149Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:8a04ada60bdca9de6493015068186b1e8904e4515a49c9c5003bbb2f29360b82

Observation 35058a2f-93cb-43bd-8c91-7f50d61a27d5 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Empirical Generalizations in Marketing , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Empirical Generalizations in Marketing , year =

Reference 64

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.208445Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:3429270eed010aa4fc64a29e684a16b8d00297d0b10f7659c7b63f51b3c01d28

Observation ec793bd8-675f-4310-a65a-e1347b98f6b2 · outbound

This paper cites 2010 , author =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 2010 , author =

Reference 65

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.352628Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:86873cf824a54e9dbb09de566d1fa2963963b45edde017a9d186318cae51cc57

Observation 223a69e0-d77c-4e67-a7b1-e44b90223b00 · outbound

This paper cites The Quarterly Journal of Economics , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information The Quarterly Journal of Economics , year =

Reference 66

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.385994Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:bb43306423a4176dc15621a9cd92c75cdd0380e5e0dae03b9f0afc7b576ae26d

Observation e74b285d-4979-48f3-b219-4dd4b40a1670 · outbound

This paper cites The Bell Journal of Economics , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information The Bell Journal of Economics , year =

Reference 67

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.395184Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:ab23f3ad1d5ffaec1016fa74388f100280bcc9c820c4e84b2473062a0e43f985

Observation bf2992be-a64b-4c4a-860a-966d58280ac4 · outbound

This paper cites The Accounting Review , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information The Accounting Review , year =

Reference 68

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.231785Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:32550ef6580795b288d3220cfcc19825049755f6c926f8f8f84b4857aec89a38

Observation a0bbac86-a786-4437-9622-9a587e1db0ea · outbound

This paper cites 1995 , author =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 1995 , author =

Reference 69

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.258870Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:4519c2d6807b1aab3dd4ffd82f9ebddee4c1a82e77cc16677040a5fdd8008557

Observation f9681a54-9ccf-4976-ad78-2f9bee3a51e8 · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Review , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Review , year =

Reference 70

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.308928Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:ee3d513b4b006bacfc8b1484e651172d9915ecb5aa0fc2f7056504d82c503f5a

Observation a3adc8e2-2f9f-4b19-beca-66ac5a42af10 · outbound

This paper cites Econometric Society 10th World Congress , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometric Society 10th World Congress , year =

Reference 71

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.267385Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:6a44d91e3baa45411025fabea7a4128f5846c60f8774c4b48aad75d4430dc2e7

Observation ce0c683c-1eba-49ac-9d98-175c51e9d1d8 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Political Economy , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Political Economy , year =

Reference 72

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.314045Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:9556175a074a7b591afcf639b594935f92412602de3aca5c08278d44e1404f9d

Observation 6ebd1ccd-71e6-45c5-9da2-38c76480eb70 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economic Theory , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economic Theory , year =

Reference 73

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.323043Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:0c9c7e3c73390e4243213d09d12b3d48163519cd0e4767a657717e08165e5559

Observation aca94e58-346f-41cb-b353-abc7494117b1 · outbound

This paper cites Persuading voters , journal =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Persuading voters , journal =

Reference 74

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.321322Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:69705c639e84c2b098163607649596aa450bae1cf9816e5adb9605a630aad1cf

Observation 67b670c7-752a-484a-af23-041a866f707b · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica , year =

Reference 75

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.307181Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:01082620e023c86b01f47b12ef9c16f9d6d2f9ed6ad80e5fd40fa0fc3168436d

Observation 20f0a01b-c34a-4aa1-8c9b-ba1a233a811f · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Journal: Microeconomics , Volume =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Journal: Microeconomics , Volume =

Reference 76

Resolution
verified exact
doi, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.035741Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:751653828c9bccf6c2118094bb7c07ff0b4afd3ee9698c0761901cee30342085

Observation 18f0338c-cf17-4387-895c-7d89b5e7d33a · outbound

This paper cites Robust implementation in general mechanisms , journal =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Robust implementation in general mechanisms , journal =

Reference 77

Resolution
verified exact
doi, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.041774Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:df9083f82feed17cfc1989dde53e5a0b1c69c26ff92b75e97b648206cb91492b

Observation 95fdfed8-0cd2-470d-9bb2-5feee525e803 · outbound

This paper cites Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk , urldate =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk , urldate =

Reference 78

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.324768Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:5056828369ec51117d13ae2d64b12893456c66cdff7c9ca2e5a39d3286ce28b9

Observation f475c5d1-a93a-43ea-8ce0-6bb657874564 · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Journal: Microeconomics , year=2019, volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Journal: Microeconomics , year=2019, volume=

Reference 79

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.347705Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:3d86a81b85701dd259fe8ca4e2ceb771e4efa7b2df0d384684472b1011aeb9e5

Observation 5813d252-e7ea-49ff-bebe-6045944b8b2b · outbound

This paper cites Theoretical Economics , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Theoretical Economics , year =

Reference 80

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.389789Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:253347be09f30b3ab301c20b956fa8006bfb34ba1d23692cb1e2ad7c7983e372

Observation a801d055-4c5d-4802-800a-6bed9b4188e2 · outbound

This paper cites Available at SSRN 1868066 , year=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Available at SSRN 1868066 , year=

Reference 81

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.281516Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:2de249354b294ece98525876f6d77a3808dd56fa607073fd2cdfe5e14269cad0

Observation e4406323-d537-4523-95c4-ce8b79b15117 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economic Literature , Volume =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economic Literature , Volume =

Reference 82

Resolution
verified exact
doi, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.034525Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:692f70df40e5a1e6b9f31ab65d9d530b91433f03f249fc781ca5b702d4e00e2f

Observation e718b9de-32f7-4382-a868-4ddd4c82d367 · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Review , Volume =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Review , Volume =

Reference 83

Resolution
verified exact
doi, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.033419Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:c5ac52db00a45918d9633d7c10125b3b79ade750e29c6b5b052340c5660d8bca

Observation 6eed5cab-4c84-4b1f-ac14-5e499b226f87 · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Review , Volume =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Review , Volume =

Reference 84

Resolution
verified exact
doi, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.028126Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:22fed5175a9ab401b2b0b92e1f9823a6b79bc96d0e0e3ac8e0c91b4e2562ccc1

Observation a79e64bf-166d-4ac1-bfdc-9c3b3cd87c26 · outbound

This paper cites Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure , journal =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure , journal =

Reference 85

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.371852Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:df7a24b2d77f34d3242a8d9cacba9c26597d713c63ed3c33ba3e48aa639cfe0a

Observation 075c4bf2-f25a-40e9-a40d-893f17376380 · outbound

This paper cites Full revelation of information in Sender--Receiver games of persuasion , journal =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Full revelation of information in Sender--Receiver games of persuasion , journal =

Reference 86

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.345003Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:6ed9e536f904cdbffe4c33ae584db900632bed27e2a41b6a673ac4654bc05be2

Observation 36fb106a-0035-4c07-855d-45286d437ea5 · outbound

This paper cites A definition , author=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information A definition , author=

Reference 87

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.331037Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:1fe875041af2e2495ebdb05aaf15ff6bbe8915cef0b7a1e8f4ecd781cb8ac631

Observation d26d9b9e-a2a3-4363-9d04-4c89ab34a026 · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Review , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Review , volume=

Reference 88

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.263516Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:8845b3e788bc70ef31287c603d8613e7dd378195bc6d9d3a1d7e872f5b0d412c

Observation b657126e-6e9c-49ed-93eb-26d2a1fd5146 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economic Theory , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economic Theory , year =

Reference 89

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.380486Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:e501898f16015e4ea4ffc9227d17f70acbeb809fc85f0d9e2e5a37b0567fe5a5

Observation b3e07c51-0d02-4623-b8ab-61f14286b49c · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Unresolved cited work

Reference 90

Resolution
unresolved
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.294755Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:6fc1e80ab046e2c5bf00ab1a254771433e6dac0f8c611e259a57c05029f0bb37

Observation 846a6176-e581-4e8e-a75a-8872dfe28686 · outbound

This paper cites Dynamic sender--receiver games , journal =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Dynamic sender--receiver games , journal =

Reference 91

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.245543Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:e59a8765bc16b07d2d1be483f531370f1730e9151378f95b0f698c02d4036301

Observation bc808483-8794-4fc4-8a9a-302fc93c7cda · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economic Theory , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economic Theory , year =

Reference 92

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.269891Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:5b93ca7054a703711b2bc5d7ee2c285494a33c11fb7303979c58ccae7f52ba64

Observation 227ee572-b140-4d76-a2a7-e730b109ae0b · outbound

This paper cites 2001 , author =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 2001 , author =

Reference 93

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.360510Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:2cdbb602b149325abe35852d8851fa640553f78217a5b3aef7df622ee709da9b

Observation 0b454938-bf2d-4a5f-b4da-53e3bb5fa5d9 · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society , pages=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society , pages=

Reference 94

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.350946Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:5659bb17402957fafe1566898b9cfe7196f9438998c2a3b5d223f5013cf49a68

Observation 96549173-c88e-4de7-b8ca-4f9e16ecebe9 · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society , pages=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society , pages=

Reference 95

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.187716Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:4feb1709aa7774a612204ac29f979d9fcec1d4848bece891d945b40ddafca0b0

Observation 1628233d-0f8e-4899-a004-b6c2a085da2b · outbound

This paper cites 2019 , MONTH = Jul, KEYWORDS =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 2019 , MONTH = Jul, KEYWORDS =

Reference 96

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.364199Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:e6db65a264f7f9c8be15fd36d0b20810698c039f762331912578aecf3381a347

Observation f11a028f-0d35-4271-944e-84c87e6124fe · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society , pages=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society , pages=

Reference 97

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.361389Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:134fad4e8b0a7fa8a1b3f2b9a34cd9b4b33f4e83f06c002dce48c112e0df01f3

Observation 5b5b3949-2221-4d43-b0ab-9d5103559dac · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Review , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Review , volume=

Reference 98

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.333502Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:8aeae0a8e35533c0fc982c723099ab3091e96c22c5c78373fefa2a32dab992c4

Observation 22cd9e92-8ffd-4295-af18-f2ca78dcc221 · outbound

This paper cites 2006 , author =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 2006 , author =

Reference 99

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.285282Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:a787c43c68e22d0bb2a5b82f137e93bef77311e77e7daa049676232ab16180ac

Observation b581b95e-a23a-4d3a-a899-d1ad2a5ca0d1 · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica , year =

Reference 100

Resolution
verified exact
arxiv_id, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.044999Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:1f9ca38ff524179f0e89dea255636bc3b33a45c33e2bccbdf671f6a52ac3194d

Pith citing papers

No inbound Pith citation observations are available.