Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

When Agents Lie: Premeditation, Persistence, and Exploitation in Repeated Games

As of 8 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 10 of 10 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2607.05132.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2607.05132 v2

Coverage vector

measured 10 of 10 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-07-11T08:19:58.245758Z

measured 10 of 10 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00

measured 0 of 0 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: cited_works

Reference resolution

10 of 10 outbound references displayed

verified exact0
verified fuzzy0
unresolved8
parse uncertain0
malformed identifier2
metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation 7d4c375c-b572-4d4b-b926-193794b10a3b · outbound

This paper cites Frontier Models are Capable of In-context Scheming.

When Agents Lie: Premeditation, Persistence, and Exploitation in Repeated Games Frontier Models are Capable of In-context Scheming

Reference 6

Resolution: malformed identifier; no resolver link, observed 2026-07-11T08:19:58.245758Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation a2182e73-cf57-44ba-a019-980427d5528d · outbound

This paper cites URL https: //doi.org/10.1145/3708359.3712149.

When Agents Lie: Premeditation, Persistence, and Exploitation in Repeated Games URL https: //doi.org/10.1145/3708359.3712149

Reference 7

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-07-11T08:19:58.245758Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 18e105cf-9f9e-4473-9c48-716842fcd582 · outbound

This paper cites Do Large Language Models Exhibit Spontaneous Rational Deception?.

When Agents Lie: Premeditation, Persistence, and Exploitation in Repeated Games Do Large Language Models Exhibit Spontaneous Rational Deception?

Reference 8

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-07-11T08:19:58.245758Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation baf44ae7-0867-46a6-be09-f14d136643a6 · outbound

This paper cites URL https: //doi.org/10.1007/s11704-024-40231-1.

When Agents Lie: Premeditation, Persistence, and Exploitation in Repeated Games URL https: //doi.org/10.1007/s11704-024-40231-1

Reference 9

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-07-11T08:19:58.245758Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 0159f13c-b780-49bc-9dab-95e3d3708070 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

When Agents Lie: Premeditation, Persistence, and Exploitation in Repeated Games Unresolved cited work

Reference 10

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-07-11T08:19:58.245758Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 1d5f3d76-9b2b-4db4-8dcd-66ecbcba22d1 · outbound

This paper cites Each agent can see prior announcements before making their own (round-robin).

When Agents Lie: Premeditation, Persistence, and Exploitation in Repeated Games Each agent can see prior announcements before making their own (round-robin)

Reference 11

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-07-11T08:19:58.245758Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 8280756a-35fb-425b-86e9-36a5706a45c0 · outbound

This paper cites You must make a strategic decision to maximize your outcome.

When Agents Lie: Premeditation, Persistence, and Exploitation in Repeated Games You must make a strategic decision to maximize your outcome

Reference 12

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-07-11T08:19:58.245758Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation c9b67524-6dfd-487f-b307-f518877b5580 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

When Agents Lie: Premeditation, Persistence, and Exploitation in Repeated Games Unresolved cited work

Reference 13

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-07-11T08:19:58.245758Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 022883d6-82c5-4ceb-b895-4568fa4907ba · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

When Agents Lie: Premeditation, Persistence, and Exploitation in Repeated Games Unresolved cited work

Reference 14

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-07-11T08:19:58.245758Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation d44fb2b7-a804-4892-bd1c-81035e49f67d · outbound

This paper cites I’ll choose CHEAP to keep costs low for everyone.

When Agents Lie: Premeditation, Persistence, and Exploitation in Repeated Games I’ll choose CHEAP to keep costs low for everyone

Reference 15

Resolution: malformed identifier; no resolver link, observed 2026-07-11T08:19:58.245758Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Pith citing papers

No inbound Pith citation observations are available.