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Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Fairness and efficiency for probabilistic allocations with participation constraints

As of 16 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 6 of 6 outbound references and 2 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:1908.04336.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
1908.04336 v3

Coverage vector

measured 6 of 6 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-14T13:53:16.191821Z

measured 8 of 8 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00

measured 2 of 2 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.512912Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: arxiv_reference, observed 2026-07-02T15:57:07.319844Z

Reference resolution

6 of 6 outbound references displayed

  • verified exact0
  • verified fuzzy4
  • unresolved1
  • parse uncertain0
  • malformed identifier0
  • metadata mismatch1

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation b3f62522-f0f1-42be-941f-b6ce4392b3e7 · outbound

This paper cites Constrained Pseudo-market Equilibrium.

Fairness and efficiency for probabilistic allocations with participation constraints Constrained Pseudo-market Equilibrium

Reference 1

Resolution
metadata mismatch
local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-14T13:53:16.321974Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-14T13:53:16.121997Z digest=sha256:6e3125827c810e7ee5d80eb4eddf02bbd5221f8d12a770be2a3c86ab422d2686

Observation 7990b183-4804-4f4d-9edc-655a9a1a747e · outbound

This paper cites Prices and efficient assignments without transfers,.

Fairness and efficiency for probabilistic allocations with participation constraints Prices and efficient assignments without transfers,

Reference 4

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-14T13:53:16.441262Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-14T13:53:16.164685Z digest=sha256:9ae6a356d7984310e1078299f4612fbb36995b27bb248c70c167ae61df122c8e

Observation 165bf2aa-4d3d-49aa-b8ac-03527d88c350 · outbound

This paper cites A certain zero-sum two-person game equivalent to the optimal assignment problem,.

Fairness and efficiency for probabilistic allocations with participation constraints A certain zero-sum two-person game equivalent to the optimal assignment problem,

Reference 91

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-14T13:53:16.354004Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-14T13:53:16.191821Z digest=sha256:71ae67104c25d2a82b113e7f0f1f02beeb0461ca4c25a3c10900543be7b8ac53

Observation 0cc85ebd-bcd5-4975-968a-5952feb921c2 · outbound

This paper cites Stability concepts in matching under distributional const raints,.

Fairness and efficiency for probabilistic allocations with participation constraints Stability concepts in matching under distributional const raints,

Reference 99

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-14T13:53:16.516208Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-14T13:53:16.138972Z digest=sha256:6c0c45d75fd72bf494fca10689178e534222bbe9a8a620390a3bade29ac6be72

Observation fca9992b-217c-475d-b6f5-0e216fd0b037 · outbound

This paper cites Equity, envy, and efficiency,.

Fairness and efficiency for probabilistic allocations with participation constraints Equity, envy, and efficiency,

Reference 637

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-14T13:53:16.397408Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-14T13:53:16.178214Z digest=sha256:8da3e949a6300546b266937b659e349ad013a76033c5c0096579da1446097719

Observation 9afc0b20-f12e-4d46-a791-94894af63b46 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Fairness and efficiency for probabilistic allocations with participation constraints Unresolved cited work

Reference 693

Resolution
unresolved
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-14T13:53:16.476772Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-14T13:53:16.149437Z digest=sha256:234cc980b20a91b88b84773015119ad863c2ab6ac7c9ddcc761348a201419154

Pith citing papers

Observation 564bb385-6c16-4a8e-a5a8-39b312fa3157 · inbound

Matching Markets with Chores cites this paper.

Matching Markets with Chores Fairness and efficiency for probabilistic allocations with participation constraints

Reference 18

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.512912Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-11T05:56:13.512912Z digest=sha256:73162c261b7e6797b53807ef2629748be2de69d4236708da7c29874011a233e3

Observation 12cc01fd-3c61-40e6-b926-13950acf2b02 · inbound

Approximation and Irrationality in Hylland--Zeckhauser Equilibria cites this paper.

Approximation and Irrationality in Hylland--Zeckhauser Equilibria Fairness and efficiency for probabilistic allocations with participation constraints

Reference 11

Resolution
verified exact
arxiv_id, observed 2026-07-02T15:57:07.321372Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-06-27T23:07:10.167425Z digest=sha256:dfa8d1c32d995f8dfb6321da5e132ddfaad27e38bef99cc85af2e0f1b91f72f9