Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising

As of 8 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 35 of 35 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2507.07418.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2507.07418 v1

Coverage vector

measured 35 of 35 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:09.218667Z

measured 35 of 35 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00

measured 0 of 0 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: cited_works

Reference resolution

35 of 35 outbound references displayed

verified exact2
verified fuzzy26
unresolved7
parse uncertain0
malformed identifier0
metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation 9dbd6764-7cbb-4672-8b38-d7a0f89edade · outbound

This paper cites write newline.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising write newline

Reference 1

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:06.662390Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation a0a0afde-ff2a-4bea-b8ae-8e2d36563d56 · outbound

This paper cites Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords

Reference 2

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:16.149837Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation e0e7b171-1222-47b3-8cc8-3ccab4cc33cc · outbound

This paper cites Selling joint ads: A regret minimization perspective.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Selling joint ads: A regret minimization perspective

Reference 3

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:15.857481Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation eff5076f-7b6b-4397-9bb4-76a289cd00d9 · outbound

This paper cites R., and Sivan, B.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising R., and Sivan, B

Reference 4

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:15.535816Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 5c42c4c2-4160-4559-badb-5ea5331a32dc · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Unresolved cited work

Reference 5

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:15.320260Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 5062fd7f-3b20-41d8-af92-26fde6e20b5f · outbound

This paper cites and Sandholm, T.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising and Sandholm, T

Reference 6

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:15.079896Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 6b587f65-60fa-42ca-bf71-b3a5d6be1113 · outbound

This paper cites and Sandholm, T.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising and Sandholm, T

Reference 7

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:14.791771Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 7073fe05-6c2d-406f-8465-61d4adf8c64a · outbound

This paper cites Certifying strategyproof auction networks.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Certifying strategyproof auction networks

Reference 8

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:14.556538Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 622fbe39-0b02-4fec-aa2d-62ef86a92a0e · outbound

This paper cites Differentiable Economics for Randomized Affine Maximizer Auctions.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Differentiable Economics for Randomized Affine Maximizer Auctions

Reference 9

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:07.069048Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation a3e1d0f5-1a0b-42e1-b7f3-7f1521839341 · outbound

This paper cites A context-integrated transformer-based neural network for auction design.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising A context-integrated transformer-based neural network for auction design

Reference 10

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:14.331483Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 95d886c4-7223-420f-84dd-9ca8e573c3d2 · outbound

This paper cites A scalable neural network for dsic affine maximizer auction design.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising A scalable neural network for dsic affine maximizer auction design

Reference 11

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:14.133867Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 65bd291e-e78b-48a5-9d46-bdd358280488 · outbound

This paper cites C., and Ravindranath, S.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising C., and Ravindranath, S

Reference 12

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:14.056004Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 3879cd98-7143-4336-b943-3a0708cbdf4d · outbound

This paper cites Internet advertising and the generalized second-price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Internet advertising and the generalized second-price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords

Reference 13

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:13.907043Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 49f570c9-8249-46aa-89af-c73557761312 · outbound

This paper cites Facebook collaborative ads, 2024.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Facebook collaborative ads, 2024

Reference 14

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:13.735183Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 5a810e88-23df-4d42-aed9-083694c83abf · outbound

This paper cites Incentives in teams.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Incentives in teams

Reference 15

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:13.560406Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation d1e23295-7967-406a-9e6f-9b0c3d7a8475 · outbound

This paper cites Optimizing affine maximizer auctions via linear programming: an application to revenue maximizing mechanism design for zero-day exploits markets.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Optimizing affine maximizer auctions via linear programming: an application to revenue maximizing mechanism design for zero-day exploits markets

Reference 16

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:13.464382Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 8f5d5908-c9fe-4204-a79a-ebf37aae7e47 · outbound

This paper cites Optimal-er auctions through attention.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Optimal-er auctions through attention

Reference 17

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:13.286143Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation d67a29f5-1a60-4326-8965-1694e6a1ee83 · outbound

This paper cites and Pennock, D.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising and Pennock, D

Reference 18

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:13.146234Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 81c25aa0-b35f-4663-b59b-15e87257d3ef · outbound

This paper cites NMA: Neural Multi-slot Auctions with Externalities for Online Advertising.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising NMA: Neural Multi-slot Auctions with Externalities for Online Advertising

Reference 19

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:09.758561Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 4a2d8719-38cb-4a48-9d63-2f2592e2b63e · outbound

This paper cites and Sandholm, T.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising and Sandholm, T

Reference 20

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:12.924491Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 8941754b-3cc6-4384-a7e9-af5aba855964 · outbound

This paper cites Neural auction: End-to-end learning of auction mechanisms for e-commerce advertising.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Neural auction: End-to-end learning of auction mechanisms for e-commerce advertising

Reference 21

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:12.794763Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 695876f5-97a5-4e50-9675-b618b83b53d0 · outbound

This paper cites Joint bidding in ad auctions.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Joint bidding in ad auctions

Reference 22

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:12.629354Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 39ab37bc-9d12-444d-854b-9a25b6f14432 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Unresolved cited work

Reference 23

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:12.463588Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 23d3387b-f9a9-4cca-8613-467771062f41 · outbound

This paper cites Preferencenet: Encoding human preferences in auction design with deep learning.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Preferencenet: Encoding human preferences in auction design with deep learning

Reference 24

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:12.301689Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 49d8b4d8-081d-407d-9025-9205419b1252 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Unresolved cited work

Reference 25

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:12.101276Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 6f945cd6-d388-45de-b252-95e8ef1b3a0f · outbound

This paper cites A., and Key, P.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising A., and Key, P

Reference 26

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:11.927813Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 860e9da6-0c11-422a-99ac-a14cba1bce5b · outbound

This paper cites The characterization of implementable choise rules.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising The characterization of implementable choise rules

Reference 27

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:11.703095Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation de503341-5455-4b47-9e7f-1bb1b84e8967 · outbound

This paper cites and Likhodedov, A.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising and Likhodedov, A

Reference 28

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:11.433802Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 37f822dd-7ad1-4f21-9de3-a73595b21826 · outbound

This paper cites Automated mechanism design via neural networks.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Automated mechanism design via neural networks

Reference 29

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:11.227497Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation b02b8f40-3c2a-48b8-9daa-9997b0237340 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Unresolved cited work

Reference 30

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:10.983118Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 7209dee4-7112-4e2e-b00d-e35190d3ee28 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Unresolved cited work

Reference 31

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:10.704099Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation fa218c12-5977-4bd3-9c62-7f77da29d018 · outbound

This paper cites Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders

Reference 32

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:10.473697Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation e13b7bb8-f05b-4284-b35e-c2e7b0a20fbb · outbound

This paper cites GemNet: Menu-Based, Strategy-Proof Multi-Bidder Auctions Through Deep Learning.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising GemNet: Menu-Based, Strategy-Proof Multi-Bidder Auctions Through Deep Learning

Reference 33

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:09.409727Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 13477291-054d-42c4-be2f-5d08b0629180 · outbound

This paper cites Optimizing multiple performance metrics with deep gsp auctions for e-commerce advertising.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Optimizing multiple performance metrics with deep gsp auctions for e-commerce advertising

Reference 34

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:10.193599Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation e5b59caa-c6fd-4723-89e3-7df9ffceb52d · outbound

This paper cites Joint auction in the online advertising market.

Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Joint auction in the online advertising market

Reference 35

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:09.899010Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Pith citing papers

No inbound Pith citation observations are available.