BadNAVer: Exploring Jailbreak Attacks On Vision-and-Language Navigation
read the original abstract
Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have recently gained attention for their generalization and reasoning capabilities in Vision-and-Language Navigation (VLN) tasks, leading to the rise of MLLM-driven navigators. However, MLLMs are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, where crafted prompts bypass safety mechanisms and trigger undesired outputs. In embodied scenarios, such vulnerabilities pose greater risks: unlike plain text models that generate toxic content, embodied agents may interpret malicious instructions as executable commands, potentially leading to real-world harm. In this paper, we present the first systematic jailbreak attack paradigm targeting MLLM-driven navigator. We propose a three-tiered attack framework and construct malicious queries across four intent categories, concatenated with standard navigation instructions. In the Matterport3D simulator, we evaluate navigation agents powered by five MLLMs and report an average attack success rate over 90%. To test real-world feasibility, we replicate the attack on a physical robot. Our results show that even well-crafted prompts can induce harmful actions and intents in MLLMs, posing risks beyond toxic output and potentially leading to physical harm.
This paper has not been read by Pith yet.
Forward citations
Cited by 1 Pith paper
-
Safety in Embodied AI: A Survey of Risks, Attacks, and Defenses
The survey organizes over 400 papers on embodied AI safety into a multi-level taxonomy and flags overlooked issues such as fragile multimodal fusion and unstable planning under jailbreaks.
discussion (0)
Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.