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REVIEW 4 major objections 5 minor 1 cited by

Optimizing Indoor RIS-Aided Physical-Layer Security: A Codebook-Generation Methodology and Measurement-Based Analysis

T0 review · 4 major / 5 minor · reviewed 2026-08-06 · deepseek-v4-flash

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Pith's one-line read Measured at 3.55 GHz, a 1-bit varactor RIS configured by either of two secrecy-maximizing algorithms keeps the legitimate user's power above the eavesdropper's at every tested angle.

desk verdict Useful FR1 RIS-PLS measurement campaign; the codebook contribution is the weak link because it is never experimentally validated. read the letter →

arxiv 2506.22082 v1 pith:XL3M3ZAH submitted 2025-06-27 eess.SP

Dimitris Kompostiotis , Dimitris Vordonis , Vassilis Paliouras , George C. Alexandropoulos This is my paper · ORCID
classification eess.SP
keywords Reconfigurableintelligentsurfacephysical-layersecuritysecrecyspectralefficiencyindoormeasurementscodebookgenerationfrequencyselectivityOFDM1-bitRIS
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

The pith

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The reading

The paper uses real indoor measurements at 3.55 GHz to ask whether a varactor-based, 1-bit reconfigurable intelligent surface can provide physical-layer security. It compares two secrecy-spectral-efficiency maximization algorithms—one that steers the whole surface to maximize the legitimate-to-eavesdropper received-power ratio, and one that splits the surface into a legitimate-user-boosting half and an eavesdropper-suppressing half—against simple beamforming and a uniform surface. The measured claim is that both secrecy algorithms deliver higher received power at the legitimate user than at the eavesdropper for every tested angular pair, while the uniform surface often delivers more power to the eavesdropper. The paper also proposes a codebook-generation methodology: precomputing RIS configurations for all pairs of 15-degree angular sectors so that a good configuration exists for any legitimate-user location independent of the eavesdropper location. A wideband 5G-style PRS test shows the RIS's frequency-selective response weakens the legitimate-to-eavesdropper power separation compared with narrowband transmission.

What carries the argument

The load-bearing objects are the two optimization algorithms plus the codebook they populate. Algorithm 1 flips each RIS column and row in turn and keeps the flip only if the ratio of the LU's received power to the ED's received power improves. Algorithm 2 does the same on two halves of the panel, maximizing LU power on one half and minimizing ED power on the other. Both operate on a 1-bit phase model: each varactor element switches between two states with approximately unit amplitude and a phase shift in $[0,\pi]$. The codebook $\mathcal{CB}$ is the resulting table of configurations indexed by the 15-degree angular sector of the LU and ED, intended to supply a good configuration for any LU position without needing the ED's channel state at run time. The objective they all serve is the sum secrecy spectral efficiency $R_{\mathrm{sec}}=\sum_v[\log_2(1+\mathrm{SNR}_l[v])-\log_2(1+\mathrm{SNR}_e[v])]^+$.

What would settle it

Run the codebook selection with no eavesdropper feedback: place the ED at one of the positions in Fig. 2, pick the codebook entry using only the LU's sector, and compare measured LU and ED powers; if any tested sector yields ED power above LU power under the selected entry, the claim that the codebook provides an ED-independent good configuration fails.

Watch

Extended reading notes

Core claim

On the paper's own terms, the central discovery is that a 1-bit varactor RIS, tuned by over-the-air measurements, can invert the power balance in an indoor wiretap setup: for all tested angular pairs, the two SSE-maximizing algorithms leave the legitimate user with higher received power than the eavesdropper, whereas a uniform RIS surface frequently gives the eavesdropper more power than the legitimate user. Algorithm 1, which sweeps column and row phase flips over the entire panel to maximize the LU/ED power ratio, performs slightly better than Algorithm 2, which dedicates half the panel to boosting the LU and half to suppressing the ED. The authors further claim that their codebook methodology, built by storing the optimized configurations for every 15-degree sector pair, yields a good RIS configuration for any LU position independently of the ED position, and that the frequency-selective behavior of the RIS is the main obstacle to wideband operation.

Load-bearing premise

The load-bearing premise is that the eavesdropper's received power is observable during configuration: both algorithms start by capturing data for the LU and the ED, so the measured secrecy gains hold only when the ED's channel can be measured, while the passive-eavesdropper scenario the paper motivates cannot supply that measurement and the codebook path is not validated end-to-end without it.

Editorial extensions

If this is right

  • If the measured power separation holds, a 1-bit RIS with the whole-surface ratio-maximizing algorithm can provide positive secrecy spectral efficiency in indoor multipath environments without relying on higher-layer encryption.
  • The slight superiority of Algorithm 1 over Algorithm 2 indicates that treating the panel as one coupled aperture, rather than two independent halves, preserves the cross-terms that matter for secrecy.
  • A codebook precomputed over angular sectors means that, whenever the eavesdropper's location is observable (e.g., an active but untrusted user), the RIS can be reconfigured by a lookup instead of an online optimization.
  • The degraded wideband PRS results imply that codebook entries tuned at a single carrier frequency may need to be validated across the full 37.44 MHz bandwidth before deployment.

Reading between the lines

Editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • An extension the paper leaves open is that a truly passive eavesdropper cannot supply the received-power readings Algorithms 1 and 2 require, so the codebook needs a selection rule using no ED measurements and an experimental check that such a rule preserves the secrecy gains.
  • The codebook could be made robust to the side-lobe effects the paper describes by storing fine-grained angular power patterns for each entry and choosing the entry whose pattern has the deepest nulls in the critical regions.
  • Because the directive transmit antenna blocked the direct AP-to-user paths, the measured gains are for a purely RIS-reflected link; realistic deployments with a strong direct path would dilute the LU/ED power separation and need separate validation.
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Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, and a circularity audit.

Referee Report

4 major / 5 minor

Summary. The paper reports an indoor measurement campaign at 3.55 GHz in which a varactor-based RIS is configured by two online search algorithms (Algorithm 1, using the whole surface, and Algorithm 2, partitioning the surface) to maximize a secrecy spectral efficiency metric between a legitimate user and an eavesdropper. The authors compare these configurations against LU-only beamforming, ED-only nulling, and a uniform surface, and they report received powers and SSE values for nine LU/ED angular pairs. The paper also proposes a codebook-generation methodology intended to provide RIS configurations for arbitrary LU positions without depending on the ED location, and it documents frequency-selectivity effects observed with a 5G PRS wideband signal.

Significance. The measurement data are a useful addition to the still-scarce experimental literature on RIS-aided physical-layer security; the hardware description is concrete, the comparison across optimization objectives is informative, and the observed frequency selectivity of the 1-bit varactor surface is a practically relevant caution. However, the experimental validation covers only the active/cooperative-eavesdropper case in which the RIS controller can measure the ED's received power. The central codebook claim—that good configurations can be selected for arbitrary LU positions independent of the ED—is asserted but not tested, and the reported gains are not accompanied by any uncertainty quantification. These gaps prevent the paper from fully supporting its advertised contributions in its current form.

major comments (4)
  1. [Section IV, Table II] The claim that both Algorithms 1 and 2 achieve an LU received power greater than the ED's "for all positions" is directly contradicted by Table II. In the row for LU 0° and ED 30°, Algorithm 2 reports LU = −68.15 dB and ED = −62.42 dB, i.e., the ED receives about 5.7 dB more power than the LU. This is a concrete counterexample to the paper's main empirical claim about Algorithm 2, and it also means the corresponding SSE value under the paper's metric would be negative. The authors must correct either the claim or the data.
  2. [Sections III and IV] The codebook methodology is never evaluated. Section III describes dividing the indoor area into 15° sectors and storing configurations obtained by running Algorithms 1 and 2 for each LU/ED pair, but Section IV contains no experiment in which a codebook entry is selected using only the LU position, no ED placed at an off-grid or held-out location, and no SSE is reported for codebook entries. Consequently, the statement "for any relative LU position with respect to the RIS, there exists a good RIS configuration independently of the ED's location" is unsupported by the presented measurements. The paper should either add such a validation experiment or substantially weaken the claim to the level of a design proposal.
  3. [Section II, Algorithms 1 and 2] The measured secrecy gains require ED feedback and therefore do not apply to the passive-eavesdropper threat model that motivates the paper. Algorithm 1 (lines 1, 7–8) and Algorithm 2 (lines 1–3, 7–13, 23–24) both require the RIS controller to capture data and measure received power at the ED, and Table II reports exactly those online-optimized configurations. For a passive ED whose CSI is unknown—the scenario stated in Section I as the main challenge—these algorithms cannot be executed. Section III's codebook is proposed to remove this dependence, but as noted above it is not validated. The paper should clearly separate what is demonstrated (optimization with an observable ED) from what is conjectured (codebook operation without ED observations).
  4. [Table II and Fig. 3] Reported values lack repeated trials or uncertainty quantification. Every entry in Table II appears to be a single measurement, and several conclusions rest on margins of a few dB (e.g., LU 0°/ED 30°, Algorithm 1: −61.76 dB at the LU vs. −64.40 dB at the ED). Indoor multipath environments exhibit variability that could easily change such conclusions, so the claim that Algorithms 1 and 2 improve LU-over-ED power "for all positions" needs either repeated measurements with error bars or at least a clear statement that these are single-trial results with correspondingly limited statistical strength. The evaluation is also in-sample: configurations are optimized and evaluated at the same positions in the same static geometry, so no generalization to unseen positions or channel realizations is demonstrated.
minor comments (5)
  1. [Abstract] The word "proviging" in the abstract should be "providing".
  2. [Section III] The phrase "15° epicenter angle each" should be "15° angular width per sector" or "15° apex angle", since the sectors are defined at the RIS center.
  3. [Section II-A.2] The sentence containing "only 12 μ = 12 2 =6" is garbled; it should read something like "only 12/μ = 6 resource blocks were occupied".
  4. [Section III] There is a missing space in "inCB" in the sentence about measuring the power pattern of each computed RIS configuration; it should read "in CB".
  5. [Section IV and Table II] The text says "Table II includes the SSE results", but Table II actually reports received powers in dB; the SSE values are displayed in Fig. 3. This discrepancy should be fixed to avoid confusing readers about what each artifact contains.

Circularity Check

2 steps flagged · score 4.0 of 10

Codebook ED-independence is asserted as an implication of an ED-feedback fitting procedure and is never tested; the reported SSE figures are the optimized objective evaluated on the same measurements.

  1. fitted input called prediction [Section III, codebook-generation paragraph; Section IV, Table II and Fig. 3 (no codebook evaluation).]
    "For each pair of LU, ED positions, we have run all approaches and stored the output RIS configurations in the codebook CB. This implies that, for any relative LU position with respect to the RIS, there exists a good RIS configuration independently of the ED's location."

    The codebook's advertised property (good configurations for arbitrary LU positions, independent of ED location) is presented as the implication of a generation procedure whose every step depends on the ED: Algorithms 1 and 2 both begin 'Capture data for both the LU and ED' and accept a phase flip only when the measured LU/ED power ratio improves. Each stored entry is therefore fitted to a specific ED position, so the independence qualifier does not follow and is never tested: Section IV evaluates only configurations optimized online (a)-(f) and never selects a codebook entry without ED measurements or with a held-out ED.

  2. fitted input called prediction [Algorithm 1 steps 1-3 and 7-9; Section IV (Table II, Fig. 3).]
    "Measure the LU's and ED's received powers: ∥(hp d+hp RISΦcgRIS)x∥2 for p=l and p=e, respectively; P old r = ∥(hl d+hl RISΦcgRIS)x∥2/∥(he d+he RISΦcgRIS)x∥2; ... for each possible pair of LU and ED positions, the received powers of the LU and ED have been measured for the following six cases for the RIS configuration: (a) when computed via Algorithm 1"

    The reported 'Achievable SSE' for Algorithms 1 and 2 at each LU/ED placement is computed from the same static-channel received-power measurements that the algorithms used to choose the configuration: Algorithm 1 keeps a phase flip only when the LU/ED power ratio (its objective) increases, so the secrecy gain is the fitted objective evaluated on the fitting data, with no spatial or temporal separation between selection and evaluation. The comparisons against the uniform surface and the LU-max/ED-min baselines retain genuine empirical content, as do the Algorithm 1 versus Algorithm 2 differences; what is self-validating is the absolute SSE claim, because by construction the reported ratio is precisely the quantity the search was designed to maximize over that same channel.

full rationale

I find partial, not structural, circularity. The narrowband experimental core is genuine: Algorithms 1 and 2 perform a real greedy search over RIS column/row phase flips, and the measured LU/ED power separation at the selected configuration, compared with the uniform surface and the LU-max/ED-min baselines (Table II, Fig. 3), is independent empirical evidence that the search works; that comparison is not forced by construction. However, two steps are self-validating. First, the reported SSE for Algorithms 1 and 2 at each placement is the log-ratio of the very received powers the algorithms maximized during selection on the same static channel, so the per-location 'achievable SSE' values are the objective at the fitted configuration, not an out-of-sample prediction. Second, the central methodological claim — that the codebook 'implies that, for any relative LU position ... there exists a good RIS configuration independently of the ED's location' — treats ED-independence as a consequence of a generation procedure in which every stored configuration was fitted against a specific ED position using ED feedback. No experiment selects a codebook entry by LU position alone or places the ED at a held-out location (Section IV has no codebook case), and the paper explicitly concedes that a CB configuration's power at non-target positions 'can vary significantly, and even exceed, the power of the targeted LU,' weakening the advertised claim to 'exclude potential critical regions.' I found no load-bearing self-citation: self-references [5], [6], [22], [23], and [38] provide background, hardware modeling, and explanations of measured imperfections, but no uniqueness theorem and no smuggled ansatz, and Algorithm 2 is credited to external work [35]. The genuine baseline comparisons and the explicit limitation statement keep this at partial circularity rather than a forced result, hence the score of 4.

Assumptions & free parameters 1 free parameters · 4 assumptions · 0 invented entities

The central claim rests on direct power measurements made at known user positions, with assumptions about noise equality, negligible direct path, and availability of ED measurements. No fitted constants are used; the only hand-chosen parameter is the codebook sector resolution.

free parameters (1)
  • Codebook sector angular resolution = 15 degrees
    The indoor area is partitioned into 15-degree sectors around the RIS center (Fig. 2). This resolution is chosen by hand and controls codebook size and spatial granularity; no sensitivity analysis is provided.
assumptions (4)
  • domain assumption ED received power is measurable by the optimizing system
    Algorithms 1 and 2 capture received data from both LU and ED at each candidate configuration. This requires an active or cooperating ED, conflicting with the passive-ED threat model in Section II.
  • domain assumption Direct AP-to-LU/ED links are negligible
    The flat-panel Tx antenna is aimed at the RIS, so the direct paths are power-limited and excluded from conclusions. Results therefore characterize the RIS-only channel.
  • domain assumption Equal noise power at LU and ED
    Section IV states identical N0 for both receivers, citing prior campaigns, but no noise-floor measurement is reported.
  • domain assumption RIS phase response is binary with unit amplitude over the band of interest
    The model assumes binary phase shifts with alpha approximately 1 and theta in [0, pi] based on external characterization in [36], without in-situ verification.

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Cite this review

Pith. "Pith review of Optimizing Indoor RIS-Aided Physical-Layer Security: A Codebook-Generation Methodology and Measurement-Based Analysis." pith.science (2026). https://pith.science/paper/XL3M3ZAH

@misc{pith2026250622082,
  author       = {Pith},
  title        = {Pith review of: Optimizing Indoor RIS-Aided Physical-Layer Security: A Codebook-Generation Methodology and Measurement-Based Analysis},
  year         = {2026},
  howpublished = {\url{https://pith.science/paper/XL3M3ZAH}},
  note         = {Machine review of arXiv:2506.22082}
}
read the original abstract

Sixth-Generation (6G) wireless networks aim to support innovative Internet-of-Things (IoT) applications that demand faster and more secure data transmission. While higher Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) layers employ measures like encryption and secure protocols to address data security, Physical-Layer Security (PLS) focuses on preventing information leakage to EavesDroppers (EDs) and mitigating the effects of jammers and spoofing attacks. In this context, the emerging technology of Reconfigurable Intelligent Surfaces (RISs) can play an instrumental role, enhancing PLS by intelligently reflecting electromagnetic waves to benefit Legitimate Users (LUs) while obstructing EDs. This paper presents practical indoor measurements to evaluate the capability of an RIS to enhance PLS, focusing on a varactor-based RIS technology designed for the FR1 band at 3.55 GHz. A comparative analysis of state-of-the-art RIS-aided secrecy optimization algorithms together with a novel approach designed in this paper, which relies on a newly generated RIS phase configuration codebook, highlight the potential of RISs to improve both data rates for LUs as well as secrecy against EDs in real-world indoor multipath environments. The results also demonstrate the frequency selectivity of the RIS, proviging practical insights on the optimization of the technology.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2506.22082 by the authors.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Measurement setup of the designed RIS-enabled PLS system. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p002_1.png] view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Top view of the considered indoor setup for RIS-aided PLS. The [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p004_2.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Achievable SSE (bits/s/Hz) with all implemented RIS design ap [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p005_3.png] view at source ↗

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Forward citations

Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. RIS-Assisted Physical Layer Security: Artificial Noise-Driven Optimization and Measurements

    eess.SP 2025-11 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    A partitioned RIS that steers the data signal to the legitimate receiver and artificial noise to an eavesdropper, configured by iterative or DFT-based phase search, improves secrecy capacity in SDR experiments.

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Pith tools

Reviewed August 6, 2026 · model on record in the stance chip above.