Strategy bifurcation and spatial inhomogeneity in a simple model of competing sellers
read the original abstract
We present a simple one-parameter model for spatially localised evolving agents competing for spatially localised resources. The model considers selling agents able to evolve their pricing strategy in competition for a fixed market. Despite its simplicity, the model displays extraordinarily rich behavior. In addition to ``cheap'' sellers pricing to cover their costs, ``expensive'' sellers spontaneously appear to exploit short-term favorable situations. These expensive sellers ``speciate'' into discrete price bands. As well as variety in pricing strategy, the ``cheap'' sellers evolve a strongly correlated spatial structure, which in turn creates niches for their expensive competitors. Thus an entire ecosystem of coexisting, discrete, symmetry-breaking strategies arises.
This paper has not been read by Pith yet.
discussion (0)
Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.