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pith:E6QTXS4D

pith:2026:E6QTXS4DCLYD6BCJ5LHZR4NJ5Z
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Geographic Patterns in I2P Peer Selection: An Empirical Network Topology Analysis

Jacques Bou Abdo, Jess Kropczynski, Murat Ozer, Siddique Abubakr Muntaka

I2P peer selection produces random geographic mixing with no significant country clustering.

arxiv:2605.14435 v1 · 2026-05-14 · cs.NI · cs.CR

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\pithnumber{E6QTXS4DCLYD6BCJ5LHZR4NJ5Z}

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2 Internet Archive
3 Author claim open · sign in to claim
4 Citations open
5 Replications open
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Claims

C1strongest claim

We found a network-level absence of significant geographic homophily. The assortativity coefficient was r = 0.017 (p = 0.222). Same-country connections (11.1%) are statistically near random expectation (10.91%).

C2weakest assumption

The SWARM-I2P dataset of 327 routers and 254 connections is representative of the full I2P network and the permutation model correctly captures the null hypothesis of random peer selection under I2P's /16 subnet rule.

C3one line summary

I2P peer selection exhibits no significant geographic homophily, with assortativity near zero and same-country links matching random expectations.

References

24 extracted · 24 resolved · 1 Pith anchors

[1] Optimizing Anonymity and Efficiency: A Critical Review of Path Selection Strategies in Tor 2025
[2] Modeling the Invisible Internet 2023
[3] Resilience of the Invisible Internet Project: A Computational Analysis 2025 · doi:10.1002/itl2.70119
[4] Mapping The Invisible Internet: Framework and Dataset 2025 · doi:10.1016/j.dib.2025.112175
[5] A systematic survey on security in anonymity networks: Vulnerabilities, attacks, de- fenses, and formalization 2024

Formal links

2 machine-checked theorem links

Receipt and verification
First computed 2026-05-17T23:39:07.086773Z
Builder pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1
Signature Pith Ed25519 (pith-v1-2026-05) · public key
Schema pith-number/v1.0

Canonical hash

27a13bcb8312f03f0449eacf98f1a9ee57df7afbbc35fdd02237b350469df6c6

Aliases

arxiv: 2605.14435 · arxiv_version: 2605.14435v1 · doi: 10.48550/arxiv.2605.14435 · pith_short_12: E6QTXS4DCLYD · pith_short_16: E6QTXS4DCLYD6BCJ · pith_short_8: E6QTXS4D
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Verify this Pith Number yourself
curl -sH 'Accept: application/ld+json' https://pith.science/pith/E6QTXS4DCLYD6BCJ5LHZR4NJ5Z \
  | jq -c '.canonical_record' \
  | python3 -c "import sys,json,hashlib; b=json.dumps(json.loads(sys.stdin.read()), sort_keys=True, separators=(',',':'), ensure_ascii=False).encode(); print(hashlib.sha256(b).hexdigest())"
# expect: 27a13bcb8312f03f0449eacf98f1a9ee57df7afbbc35fdd02237b350469df6c6
Canonical record JSON
{
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    "abstract_canon_sha256": "8ec633c24a5b1c81d89b66419dc992bcdf182fbe4533048062c2a400440bdef9",
    "cross_cats_sorted": [
      "cs.CR"
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    "license": "http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/",
    "primary_cat": "cs.NI",
    "submitted_at": "2026-05-14T06:28:52Z",
    "title_canon_sha256": "83f87450afc6b7d56fb29335feb4ce28d0c1df42c7d902404e7f29a5a44721f0"
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  "source": {
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    "kind": "arxiv",
    "version": 1
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}