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pith:2026:P7C4V6T5DGI4FBR4FFRXQWJWQI
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Partial Identification of the Valuation Distribution in Sequential English Auctions

Dongwoo Kim, Kyoo il Kim, Pallavi Pal

Sequential English auctions allow partial identification of bidder valuations through dynamic opportunity-cost restrictions.

arxiv:2605.14400 v1 · 2026-05-14 · econ.EM

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Claims

C1strongest claim

We replace it with a dynamic opportunity-cost restriction, yielding nonparametric valuation bounds without solving a dynamic equilibrium. Sharp bounds are also characterized. We propose a novel moment-condition inversion estimator that pools auctions with heterogeneous bidder counts.

C2weakest assumption

Bidders satisfy the dynamic opportunity-cost restriction: they do not let rivals win at prices below their opportunity cost of waiting for future auctions.

C3one line summary

Nonparametric bounds on bidder valuations in sequential English auctions are obtained via a dynamic opportunity-cost restriction, with a new estimator pooling heterogeneous auctions and applied to Korean and online car data.

References

56 extracted · 56 resolved · 0 Pith anchors

[1] Management Science , volume= 2025
[2] Annales d'Economie et de Statistique , pages= 1994
[3] Generalized instrumental variable models , author=. Econometrica , volume=. 2017 , publisher= 2017
[4] The American Economic Review , volume= 1981
[5] Theoretical Economics , volume= 2023
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First computed 2026-05-17T23:39:07.494377Z
Builder pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1
Signature Pith Ed25519 (pith-v1-2026-05) · public key
Schema pith-number/v1.0

Canonical hash

7fc5cafa7d1991c2863c296378593682042ec5b1317526bdf732aaf19c96537b

Aliases

arxiv: 2605.14400 · arxiv_version: 2605.14400v1 · doi: 10.48550/arxiv.2605.14400 · pith_short_12: P7C4V6T5DGI4 · pith_short_16: P7C4V6T5DGI4FBR4 · pith_short_8: P7C4V6T5
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Verify this Pith Number yourself
curl -sH 'Accept: application/ld+json' https://pith.science/pith/P7C4V6T5DGI4FBR4FFRXQWJWQI \
  | jq -c '.canonical_record' \
  | python3 -c "import sys,json,hashlib; b=json.dumps(json.loads(sys.stdin.read()), sort_keys=True, separators=(',',':'), ensure_ascii=False).encode(); print(hashlib.sha256(b).hexdigest())"
# expect: 7fc5cafa7d1991c2863c296378593682042ec5b1317526bdf732aaf19c96537b
Canonical record JSON
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    "license": "http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/",
    "primary_cat": "econ.EM",
    "submitted_at": "2026-05-14T05:38:16Z",
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