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pith:RNZAGT2H

pith:2026:RNZAGT2H3MNJE3ZIP4Z5RO5Y7Z
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Numerical security analysis for practical quantum key distribution

\'Alvaro Navarrete, Guillermo Curr\'as-Lorenzo, Marcos Curty, Margarida Pereira

A numerical finite-key security framework proves security for realistic QKD setups against general coherent attacks using only partial device characterization.

arxiv:2605.12984 v1 · 2026-05-13 · quant-ph

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Claims

C1strongest claim

Here we introduce a versatile numerical finite-key security framework valid against general coherent attacks and applicable to a broad class of practical QKD setups. It accommodates most relevant imperfections at both transmitter and receiver, including non-IID signals arising in high-speed QKD systems due to the limited bandwidth of optical modulators, while requiring only partial characterization of the apparatuses.

C2weakest assumption

The framework assumes that the partial characterization of the transmitter and receiver is sufficient to bound the effect of all uncharacterized imperfections on the security proof.

C3one line summary

A numerical framework proves finite-key security for practical decoy-state QKD systems with transmitter and receiver imperfections including non-IID signals.

References

73 extracted · 73 resolved · 2 Pith anchors

[1] constructive interference
[2] , N}, (a) Alice chooses a pair of bit/basis (a) and intensity (µ) settings, which for conciseness we group in a single indexi∈ {0,1, n A −1}, with probabilityp A i ≡p A a,µ
[3] The key rounds—i.e., those in whichβ=Z,a, b∈ {0,1}, andµ= 0—are used to generate the users’ sifted keys
[4] a In this box we omit the round indexufrom the quantities whenever it is clear from the context
[5] Decoy-state QKD protocols General setting In a decoy-state QKD scheme (see Box 4), Alice generates phase-randomized weak-coherent pulses (PRWCPs)—for concreteness we consider continuous phase randomiz
Receipt and verification
First computed 2026-05-18T03:09:00.632077Z
Builder pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1
Signature Pith Ed25519 (pith-v1-2026-05) · public key
Schema pith-number/v1.0

Canonical hash

8b72034f47db1a926f287f33d8bbb8fe7790e5a60698b307ba06563a9984fe9a

Aliases

arxiv: 2605.12984 · arxiv_version: 2605.12984v1 · doi: 10.48550/arxiv.2605.12984 · pith_short_12: RNZAGT2H3MNJ · pith_short_16: RNZAGT2H3MNJE3ZI · pith_short_8: RNZAGT2H
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Verify this Pith Number yourself
curl -sH 'Accept: application/ld+json' https://pith.science/pith/RNZAGT2H3MNJE3ZIP4Z5RO5Y7Z \
  | jq -c '.canonical_record' \
  | python3 -c "import sys,json,hashlib; b=json.dumps(json.loads(sys.stdin.read()), sort_keys=True, separators=(',',':'), ensure_ascii=False).encode(); print(hashlib.sha256(b).hexdigest())"
# expect: 8b72034f47db1a926f287f33d8bbb8fe7790e5a60698b307ba06563a9984fe9a
Canonical record JSON
{
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    "abstract_canon_sha256": "63a616d4d58d830ade9cd2f44fc4160caa28b8f5053f330b5deff0ee3207a754",
    "cross_cats_sorted": [],
    "license": "http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/",
    "primary_cat": "quant-ph",
    "submitted_at": "2026-05-13T04:27:03Z",
    "title_canon_sha256": "90bcbf3a7b3b369b1b3a89717d7e5977eceb9e90ea92789e09ef3e2abd94bf04"
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  "source": {
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