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pith:S4764BVJ

pith:2026:S4764BVJJ4LBLCWNEEJ7YOSDVD
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Fair Commodity Taxation

Daniel Luo, Eric Gao

In economies with multiple monopolists and correlated valuations, fair taxation mechanisms always ration goods more than unregulated monopolies and never benefit from randomization.

arxiv:2604.19044 v2 · 2026-04-21 · econ.TH

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3 Author claim open · sign in to claim
4 Citations open
5 Replications open
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The bundle contains the canonical record plus signed events. A mirror can host it anywhere and recompute the same current state with the deterministic merge algorithm.

Claims

C1strongest claim

We characterize the set of mechanisms that are on the fairness-efficiency frontier under regularity conditions on the distribution of types. Furthermore, under these conditions all allocations on the fairness-efficiency frontier ration the good more than an unregulated monopolist. The tax authority never benefits from randomizing the allocation of goods.

C2weakest assumption

Regularity conditions on the distribution of types are required to characterize the fairness-efficiency frontier and the rationing result; the model also assumes consumers interact independently with many monopolists and that fairness is captured by second-order stochastic dominance shifts in correlation structure.

C3one line summary

In multi-monopolist settings with correlated values, optimal tax mechanisms lie on a fairness-efficiency frontier where they ration goods more than unregulated monopolists and never benefit from random allocations.

Receipt and verification
First computed 2026-05-29T02:05:45.049111Z
Builder pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1
Signature Pith Ed25519 (pith-v1-2026-05) · public key
Schema pith-number/v1.0

Canonical hash

973fee06a94f16158acd2113fc3a43a8e17956930e3406ea056096089936b94a

Aliases

arxiv: 2604.19044 · arxiv_version: 2604.19044v2 · doi: 10.48550/arxiv.2604.19044 · pith_short_12: S4764BVJJ4LB · pith_short_16: S4764BVJJ4LBLCWN · pith_short_8: S4764BVJ
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Verify this Pith Number yourself
curl -sH 'Accept: application/ld+json' https://pith.science/pith/S4764BVJJ4LBLCWNEEJ7YOSDVD \
  | jq -c '.canonical_record' \
  | python3 -c "import sys,json,hashlib; b=json.dumps(json.loads(sys.stdin.read()), sort_keys=True, separators=(',',':'), ensure_ascii=False).encode(); print(hashlib.sha256(b).hexdigest())"
# expect: 973fee06a94f16158acd2113fc3a43a8e17956930e3406ea056096089936b94a
Canonical record JSON
{
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    "abstract_canon_sha256": "e1e9157c14af6c161c6e5eda7e36ba501fbb2ccbccf1163fc656bbc08b175bce",
    "cross_cats_sorted": [],
    "license": "http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/",
    "primary_cat": "econ.TH",
    "submitted_at": "2026-04-21T03:50:42Z",
    "title_canon_sha256": "e35b94e3bc98c1127bac0fcae36af1e577c659c5d9a9c12f76ec8de2787b42b9"
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    "kind": "arxiv",
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}