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pith:TLJIKKQS

pith:2026:TLJIKKQSDBE2LQHUE663LB4R5J
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Probabilistic Mechanism Design in Diffusion Auctions

Hanpin Wang, Xinlun Zhang, Yongzhi Cao, Yu Huang, Zhechen Li

The Probabilistic Diffusion Mechanism achieves incentive compatibility, non-negative revenue, and constant-approximation efficiency for diffusion auctions on path graphs and extends to general networks.

arxiv:2605.17221 v1 · 2026-05-17 · cs.GT

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Claims

C1strongest claim

We propose the Probabilistic Diffusion Mechanism (PDM), a novel mechanism tailored for path graphs, which satisfies all three desired properties: incentive compatibility, non-negative revenue, and approximate efficiency with a constant approximation bound.

C2weakest assumption

The base mechanism is defined only for path graphs and extensions rely on a map f that preserves key properties when the network is arbitrary; if no such f exists that simultaneously maintains IC, non-negative revenue, and the constant efficiency bound for general graphs, the general claim fails.

C3one line summary

PDM and f-PDM achieve IC, non-negative revenue, and constant-approximate efficiency in diffusion auctions on paths and general networks, with further variants for Sybil attacks, collusion, and multi-unit cases.

References

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[1] SIAM Journal on Computing28(6), 2117–2132 (1999) 1999
[2] Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences97(21), 11149–11152 (2000) 24 X 2000
[3] Journal of Economic Theory100(2), 295– 328 (2001) 2001
[4] Journal of Economic Theory144(2), 565–603 (2009) 2009
[5] In: Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2023
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First computed 2026-05-20T00:03:45.974008Z
Builder pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1
Signature Pith Ed25519 (pith-v1-2026-05) · public key
Schema pith-number/v1.0

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9ad2852a121849a5c0f427bdb58791ea57f356ef623551e7c1d18f49aa68ddc3

Aliases

arxiv: 2605.17221 · arxiv_version: 2605.17221v1 · doi: 10.48550/arxiv.2605.17221 · pith_short_12: TLJIKKQSDBE2 · pith_short_16: TLJIKKQSDBE2LQHU · pith_short_8: TLJIKKQS
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curl -sH 'Accept: application/ld+json' https://pith.science/pith/TLJIKKQSDBE2LQHUE663LB4R5J \
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Canonical record JSON
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