Strategically robust LQ dynamic games reduce to standard LQ games with penalized fictitious adversaries, admitting unique Markovian linear equilibria computable by coupled Riccati equations, with simulations revealing robustness benefits and a free-lunch performance improvement.
Controllability metrics, limitations and algorithms for complex networks,
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Establishes structural equivalence between finite-time controllability Gramian decomposition and approximate OED information matrix, mapping VCS to D-optimality and AECS to A-optimality.
Introduces target volumetric controllability score and target average energy controllability score as solutions to convex problems on the output Gramian, with reduced-system approximations and brain-network experiments.
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Strategically Robust Linear Quadratic Dynamic Games
Strategically robust LQ dynamic games reduce to standard LQ games with penalized fictitious adversaries, admitting unique Markovian linear equilibria computable by coupled Riccati equations, with simulations revealing robustness benefits and a free-lunch performance improvement.
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Relationship Between Controllability Scoring and Optimal Experimental Design
Establishes structural equivalence between finite-time controllability Gramian decomposition and approximate OED information matrix, mapping VCS to D-optimality and AECS to A-optimality.
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Target Controllability Scores for Actuation-Constrained Network Intervention
Introduces target volumetric controllability score and target average energy controllability score as solutions to convex problems on the output Gramian, with reduced-system approximations and brain-network experiments.