An eco-evolutionary model using adaptive dynamics shows overuse and underuse arise as alternative evolutionary outcomes depending on whether provisioning benefits increase concavely or convexly.
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The Accountability Incompleteness Theorem demonstrates that human-AI collectives above the Accountability Horizon with feedback cycles cannot simultaneously meet attributability, foreseeability, non-vacuity, and completeness requirements for legitimate accountability.
A game-theoretic model demonstrates a Nash equilibrium in which authors voluntarily accept random pre-review rejection to reduce reviewer burden and raise evaluation quality.
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Incorporating the underuse problem in the tragedy of the commons
An eco-evolutionary model using adaptive dynamics shows overuse and underuse arise as alternative evolutionary outcomes depending on whether provisioning benefits increase concavely or convexly.
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The Accountability Incompleteness Theorem demonstrates that human-AI collectives above the Accountability Horizon with feedback cycles cannot simultaneously meet attributability, foreseeability, non-vacuity, and completeness requirements for legitimate accountability.
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Can We Volunteer Out of the Peer Review Crisis?
A game-theoretic model demonstrates a Nash equilibrium in which authors voluntarily accept random pre-review rejection to reduce reviewer burden and raise evaluation quality.