EconCSLib is a public Lean 4 library containing 20 formalized papers plus shared components for probability, auctions, matching, and social choice, supported by an LLM-driven formalization workflow.
Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, Elchanan Mossel, and Amin Saberi
5 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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cs.GT 5representative citing papers
Two polynomial-time algorithms are proposed for multilevel fair allocation under matroid-rank preferences, one generic with efficiency and fairness guarantees and one extending General Yankee Swap with efficiency guarantees and strong practical fairness.
Optimal deterministic strategyproof (and group strategyproof) mechanisms minimizing envy ratio are characterized for two interval-restricted one-facility location settings on the line, with lower and upper bounds given for randomized mechanisms.
Existence of EF1 and constant-ρ MMS allocations proven for submodular valuations.
Simpler poly-time constructions for EF2X/EF3X and improved √2/2-EFX and 2/3-EFX approximations for monotone and additive valuations in restricted hypergraphs.
citing papers explorer
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Multilevel Fair Allocation with Matroid-Rank Preferences
Two polynomial-time algorithms are proposed for multilevel fair allocation under matroid-rank preferences, one generic with efficiency and fairness guarantees and one extending General Yankee Swap with efficiency guarantees and strong practical fairness.
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Facility Location Game with Envy Ratio
Optimal deterministic strategyproof (and group strategyproof) mechanisms minimizing envy ratio are characterized for two interval-restricted one-facility location settings on the line, with lower and upper bounds given for randomized mechanisms.
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Simultaneous EF1 and approximate MMS allocations for submodular valuations
Existence of EF1 and constant-ρ MMS allocations proven for submodular valuations.
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Almost EFX in Hypergraphs
Simpler poly-time constructions for EF2X/EF3X and improved √2/2-EFX and 2/3-EFX approximations for monotone and additive valuations in restricted hypergraphs.