In the nonlinear voter model, evolutionary games, and the partisan voter model, one-sided zealotry enforces consensus in infinite populations only if the social impact function grows at least linearly (q>=1); sublinear impact keeps consensus unstable.
Allowing for a general social impact 11 function, Eqs
1 Pith paper cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
1
Pith paper citing it
citation-role summary
extension 1
citation-polarity summary
fields
physics.soc-ph 1years
2025 1verdicts
CONDITIONAL 1roles
extension 1polarities
extend 1representative citing papers
citing papers explorer
-
Breaking coexistence: Zealotry vs. nonlinear social impact
In the nonlinear voter model, evolutionary games, and the partisan voter model, one-sided zealotry enforces consensus in infinite populations only if the social impact function grows at least linearly (q>=1); sublinear impact keeps consensus unstable.