MalSkillBench supplies the first sandbox-verified dataset of malicious agent skills and shows that existing detectors achieve high recall on code injection but collapse on prompt injection and agent-control attacks.
hub Canonical reference
Skillprobe: Security auditing for emerging agent skill marketplaces via multi-agent collaboration
Canonical reference. 80% of citing Pith papers cite this work as background.
hub tools
citation-role summary
citation-polarity summary
years
2026 22representative citing papers
Harmful skills in open agent ecosystems raise average harm scores from 0.27 to 0.76 across six LLMs by lowering refusal rates when tasks are presented via pre-installed skills.
SkillFuzz is an execution-free fuzzing method that extracts skill contracts and applies contract-guided MCTS to discover over 1000 implicit intents in LLM skill marketplaces.
Empirical study of EvoMap shows 98% of assets never reused, scores driven by self-reported metadata, and 84% of assets using vacuous validation tests.
SMMBench is a benchmark evaluating multimodal agents on cross-source reasoning, conflict resolution, preference reasoning, and action prediction, showing current systems struggle with evidence distributed across heterogeneous sources.
Sefz discovers specification violations in 29.9% of 402 real-world agent skills by translating guardrails into reachability goals and guiding LLM mutations with a multi-armed bandit.
Proteus demonstrates that adaptive red-teaming achieves 40-90% attack success after five rounds and bypasses even strong auditors at up to 41% joint success, revealing that static skill vetting underestimates residual risk.
Malicious Skills induce coding agents to hallucinate and import attacker-controlled packages at high rates while evading detection.
SIGIL cryptographically seals the audit-runtime gap for LLM skills via an on-chain registry with four publication types, DAO vetting, and a runtime verification loader that enforces integrity and permissions.
Runtime Skill Audit introduces targeted runtime probing to detect malicious LLM agent skills, reporting 90% accuracy and resilience to self-evolving attacks on 100 skills versus static baselines.
DeepTrap automates discovery of contextual vulnerabilities in OpenClaw agents via trajectory optimization, showing that unsafe behavior can be induced while preserving task completion and that final-response checks are insufficient.
Malicious actors could use AI agents to submit large numbers of fake papers, inflating the submission count and thereby raising the acceptance odds for a small set of chosen legitimate papers under stable conference acceptance rates.
SkillScope detects over-privileged LLM agent skills with 94.53% F1 score via graph analysis and replay validation, finding 7,039 problematic skills in the wild and reducing violations by 88.56% while preserving task completion.
A hierarchical triage pipeline combining regex/AST checks, four LLM security sub-tasks, and a debating jury detects malicious agent skills with reported F1 ≈ 0.92 on 390 labeled skills.
VIGIL introduces a policy language and symbolic evaluation rules to enforce context-aware behavioral specifications on LLM agent traces, achieving over 95% recall and under 10% false positives on real tasks.
SkillCamo conceals malicious instructions in images within agent skills to bypass text-based scanners, while ExecScan improves detection via joint multimodal and execution-grounded analysis.
Analysis of 67,453 OpenClaw skills shows three scanners overlap on at most 10.4% of combined positives, with 81.9% flagged by only one scanner and distinct profiles for malicious versus suspicious skills.
SkillVetBench is a two-stage benchmark combining natural-language semantic vetting and instrumented sandbox execution to detect and provide runtime evidence for malicious skills in open agent platforms, with experiments showing static methods miss up to 89% of threats.
Retrieving similar past trajectories and synthesizing a task-conditioned skill prompt improves fixed LLM agents over static-skill and memory baselines on three benchmarks.
LLM agent progress depends on externalizing cognitive functions into memory, skills, protocols, and harness engineering that coordinates them reliably.
Explicit provenance across the full agentic AI lifecycle is the necessary condition for making responsibility computable and actionable.
Proposes a trust schema including verification levels and a biconditional correctness criterion to verify skills in human-in-the-loop agent runtimes, reducing the need for constant oversight.
citing papers explorer
-
MalSkillBench: A Runtime-Verified Benchmark of Malicious Agent Skills
MalSkillBench supplies the first sandbox-verified dataset of malicious agent skills and shows that existing detectors achieve high recall on code injection but collapse on prompt injection and agent-control attacks.
-
HarmfulSkillBench: How Do Harmful Skills Weaponize Your Agents?
Harmful skills in open agent ecosystems raise average harm scores from 0.27 to 0.76 across six LLMs by lowering refusal rates when tasks are presented via pre-installed skills.
-
SkillFuzz: Fuzzing Skill Composition for Implicit Intents Discovery in Open Skill Marketplaces
SkillFuzz is an execution-free fuzzing method that extracts skill contracts and applies contract-guided MCTS to discover over 1000 implicit intents in LLM skill marketplaces.
-
Behind EvoMap: Characterizing a Self-Evolving Agent-to-Agent Collaboration Network
Empirical study of EvoMap shows 98% of assets never reused, scores driven by self-reported metadata, and 84% of assets using vacuous validation tests.
-
SMMBench: A Benchmark for Source-Distributed Multimodal Agent Memory
SMMBench is a benchmark evaluating multimodal agents on cross-source reasoning, conflict resolution, preference reasoning, and action prediction, showing current systems struggle with evidence distributed across heterogeneous sources.
-
No Attack Required: Semantic Fuzzing for Specification Violations in Agent Skills
Sefz discovers specification violations in 29.9% of 402 real-world agent skills by translating guardrails into reachability goals and guiding LLM mutations with a multi-armed bandit.
-
Proteus: A Self-Evolving Red Team for Agent Skill Ecosystems
Proteus demonstrates that adaptive red-teaming achieves 40-90% attack success after five rounds and bypasses even strong auditors at up to 41% joint success, revealing that static skill vetting underestimates residual risk.
-
Trust Me, Import This: Dependency Steering Attacks via Malicious Agent Skills
Malicious Skills induce coding agents to hallucinate and import attacker-controlled packages at high rates while evading detection.
-
Sealing the Audit-Runtime Gap for LLM Skills
SIGIL cryptographically seals the audit-runtime gap for LLM skills via an on-chain registry with four publication types, DAO vetting, and a runtime verification loader that enforces integrity and permissions.
-
Runtime Skill Audit: Targeted Runtime Probing for Agent Skill Security
Runtime Skill Audit introduces targeted runtime probing to detect malicious LLM agent skills, reporting 90% accuracy and resilience to self-evolving attacks on 100 skills versus static baselines.
-
Red-Teaming Agent Execution Contexts: Open-World Security Evaluation on OpenClaw
DeepTrap automates discovery of contextual vulnerabilities in OpenClaw agents via trajectory optimization, showing that unsafe behavior can be induced while preserving task completion and that final-response checks are insufficient.
-
Position: Academic Conferences are Potentially Facing Denominator Gaming Caused by Fully Automated Scientific Agents
Malicious actors could use AI agents to submit large numbers of fake papers, inflating the submission count and thereby raising the acceptance odds for a small set of chosen legitimate papers under stable conference acceptance rates.
-
SkillScope: Toward Fine-Grained Least-Privilege Enforcement for Agent Skills
SkillScope detects over-privileged LLM agent skills with 94.53% F1 score via graph analysis and replay validation, finding 7,039 problematic skills in the wild and reducing violations by 88.56% while preserving task completion.
-
SkillSieve: A Hierarchical Triage Framework for Detecting Malicious AI Agent Skills
A hierarchical triage pipeline combining regex/AST checks, four LLM security sub-tasks, and a debating jury detects malicious agent skills with reported F1 ≈ 0.92 on 390 labeled skills.
-
VIGIL: Runtime Enforcement of Behavioral Specifications in AI Agent Skills
VIGIL introduces a policy language and symbolic evaluation rules to enforce context-aware behavioral specifications on LLM agent traces, achieving over 95% recall and under 10% false positives on real tasks.
-
Seeing Is Not Screening: Multimodal Hidden Instruction Attacks on Agent Skill Scanners
SkillCamo conceals malicious instructions in images within agent skills to bypass text-based scanners, while ExecScan improves detection via joint multimodal and execution-grounded analysis.
-
ClawHub Security Signals: When VirusTotal, Static Analysis, and SkillSpector Disagree
Analysis of 67,453 OpenClaw skills shows three scanners overlap on at most 10.4% of combined positives, with 81.9% flagged by only one scanner and distinct profiles for malicious versus suspicious skills.
-
Benchmarking Security Risk Detection and Verification in Open Agentic Skill Ecosystems
SkillVetBench is a two-stage benchmark combining natural-language semantic vetting and instrumented sandbox execution to detect and provide runtime evidence for malicious skills in open agent platforms, with experiments showing static methods miss up to 89% of threats.
-
Skills on the Fly: Test-Time Adaptive Skill Synthesis for LLM Agents
Retrieving similar past trajectories and synthesizing a task-conditioned skill prompt improves fixed LLM agents over static-skill and memory baselines on three benchmarks.
-
Externalization in LLM Agents: A Unified Review of Memory, Skills, Protocols and Harness Engineering
LLM agent progress depends on externalizing cognitive functions into memory, skills, protocols, and harness engineering that coordinates them reliably.
-
Responsible Agentic AI Requires Explicit Provenance
Explicit provenance across the full agentic AI lifecycle is the necessary condition for making responsibility computable and actionable.
-
Skills as Verifiable Artifacts: A Trust Schema and a Biconditional Correctness Criterion for Human-in-the-Loop Agent Runtimes
Proposes a trust schema including verification levels and a biconditional correctness criterion to verify skills in human-in-the-loop agent runtimes, reducing the need for constant oversight.