Model-free DQN learning achieves suboptimality bounds of O(1/sqrt(Ns)) + O(1/N) in Karma DPGs at equilibrium, and deep RL combined with fictitious play empirically reaches near-Stationary Nash Equilibrium from scratch.
Dynamic population games: A tractable intersection of mean-field games and population games.IEEE Control Systems Letters, 8:1072–1077
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Towards Model-Free Learning in Dynamic Population Games: An Application to Karma Economies
Model-free DQN learning achieves suboptimality bounds of O(1/sqrt(Ns)) + O(1/N) in Karma DPGs at equilibrium, and deep RL combined with fictitious play empirically reaches near-Stationary Nash Equilibrium from scratch.