In discretized first-price auctions, online gradient ascent by buyers produces time-average outcomes that match the efficient allocation of the second-price auction.
arXiv preprint arXiv:2501.15295 , year=
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A polynomial-time algorithm computes exact second-price pacing equilibria for constant numbers of goods by partitioning the multiplier space into geometric cells with fixed bid orderings and reducing each to a linear feasibility program.
citing papers explorer
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Gradient Dynamics in First-Price Auctions: Iterative Strategy Elimination via Cubic Potentials
In discretized first-price auctions, online gradient ascent by buyers produces time-average outcomes that match the efficient allocation of the second-price auction.
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Pacing Equilibria in Second-Price Auctions with Few Goods
A polynomial-time algorithm computes exact second-price pacing equilibria for constant numbers of goods by partitioning the multiplier space into geometric cells with fixed bid orderings and reducing each to a linear feasibility program.