In a Bayesian persuasion model of AI misalignment on bit strings, receiver utility under sender-optimal signaling is at most 3/2 times prior-only utility, with an additive bound for near-product priors and a 6-bit example achieving 39/31.
InProceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
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Quantifying Theoretical AI Alignment Guarantees: Receiver-Utility Bounds in Bayesian Persuasion
In a Bayesian persuasion model of AI misalignment on bit strings, receiver utility under sender-optimal signaling is at most 3/2 times prior-only utility, with an additive bound for near-product priors and a 6-bit example achieving 39/31.