Only dictatorships are self-maintaining under i.i.d. unbiased beliefs with arbitrary tie-breaking, while rules with minimal winning coalitions of size at most 2 are stable under pessimistic beliefs and status-quo tie-breaking.
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Choquet rationalizability is characterized by common belief in Choquet rationality, equals IESDA in an extended game, and shrinks or grows with ambiguity love or aversion.
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Centralization and Stability in Formal Constitutions
Only dictatorships are self-maintaining under i.i.d. unbiased beliefs with arbitrary tie-breaking, while rules with minimal winning coalitions of size at most 2 are stable under pessimistic beliefs and status-quo tie-breaking.
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Common Belief in Choquet Rationality and Ambiguity Attitudes -- Extended Abstract
Choquet rationalizability is characterized by common belief in Choquet rationality, equals IESDA in an extended game, and shrinks or grows with ambiguity love or aversion.