pith. sign in

arxiv: 2512.22051 · v2 · pith:5M2RONR5new · submitted 2025-12-26 · 💰 econ.TH · cs.GT

Centralization and Stability in Formal Constitutions

Yotam Gafni This is my paper

Pith reviewed 2026-05-16 19:47 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💰 econ.TH cs.GT
keywords social choice functionself-maintainingcentralizationdictatorshipvoting dynamicsinstitution designDAO
0
0 comments X

The pith

Only dictatorships are self-maintaining when social choice functions can vote to replace themselves.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper models a formal constitution where the current voting rule aggregates votes on whether to replace itself with another rule. An SCF is self-maintaining if no other rule can replace it through this process. In the case of agents with independent unbiased beliefs, only dictatorships resist replacement while all other functions have sequences of changes leading to a dictatorship. Under pessimistic beliefs with status-quo bias in ties, the stable rules are those where minimal winning coalitions have size at most two. Allowing voters to be forward-looking or to value crowd wisdom permits less centralized rules to become self-maintaining.

Core claim

For the i.i.d. unbiased case with arbitrary tie-breaking and general Boolean functions, only a dictatorship is self-maintaining, and any other SCF has a path of changes that arrives at a dictatorship. With a pessimistic approach, tie-breaking that prefers the status quo, and WMGs, the self-maintaining rules are exactly all games with minimal winning coalitions of size at most 2.

What carries the argument

The self-maintaining property of an SCF, which checks whether its own aggregation prevents replacement by any alternative rule under given agent beliefs.

If this is right

  • Any non-dictatorial SCF can be replaced through a sequence of votes until a dictatorship is reached.
  • Self-maintaining SCFs under pessimistic beliefs are precisely the weighted majority games whose smallest winning coalitions have size at most two.
  • Forward-looking voters or crowd-wisdom payoffs enlarge the set of self-maintaining rules beyond pure dictatorships.
  • The framework directly constrains which voting rules can persist in self-referential systems such as DAOs.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • Starting with a decentralized rule may still produce centralization over time unless belief models include forward-looking or wisdom effects.
  • Stability could be tested by varying the distribution of agent beliefs and tracking whether replacement paths terminate.
  • The same replacement logic may apply to other self-governing systems such as algorithmic governance protocols.

Load-bearing premise

Agents vote according to ex-ante beliefs about whether future decisions are better handled by the current SCF or the proposed replacement.

What would settle it

An experiment or simulation in which a non-dictatorial SCF persists unchanged across multiple replacement votes under i.i.d. unbiased agent beliefs.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2512.22051 by Yotam Gafni.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: Stable oligarchies as a function of λ and p. Black x marks are used for small oligarchies (such as dictatorship, consensus-duopoly and 3-oligopoly), and blue circles for larger-value oligarchies (upwards of i = 10). longer self-maintaining, and we remain only with the dictatorship and (possibly) a small oligarchy. As we reach the high λ, high p corner, a dictatorship is the only self-maintaining rule. To s… view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Figure 2: Two-dimensional Slices of the three-dimensional graph of stable-oligarchies as a function of [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p019_2.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Figure 3: Centralization dynamics for different extraction Levels ( [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p019_3.png] view at source ↗
read the original abstract

Consider a social-choice function (SCF) is chosen to decide votes in a formal system, including votes to replace the voting method itself. Agents vote according to their ex-ante belief over what decisions are considered, and whether they prefer them to be decided by the incumbent SCF or the suggested replacement. The existing SCF then aggregates the agents' votes and arrives at a decision of whether it should itself be replaced. An SCF is self-maintaining if it can not be replaced in such fashion by any other SCF. Our focus is on the implications of self-maintenance for centralization. For this purpose, unlike [Barbera and Jackson, 2004], we do not generally restrict attention to anonymous SCFs. We also do not restrict attention to neutral SCFs, unlike [Koray, 2000]. We present results considering optimistic, pessimistic and i.i.d. approaches with respect to agent beliefs, different tie-breaking rules, and different SCF domains. To highlight two of the results, (i) for the i.i.d. unbiased case with arbitrary tie-breaking and general Boolean functions, we prove an Arrow-Style Theorem for Dynamics: We show that only a dictatorship is self-maintaining, and any other SCF has a path of changes that arrives at a dictatorship. (ii) With a pessimistic approach, tie-breaking that prefers the status quo, and WMGs, we provide a tight characterization of the self-maintaining rules, which are exactly all games with minimal winning coalitions of size at most 2. We then consider two extensions, (i) forward-looking voters, (ii) Where the voter utility depends on wisdom of the crowd effects. In both cases, less centralized SCFs become self-maintaining. All in all we provide a basic framework and body of results for centralization dynamics and stability, applicable for institution design, especially in formal De-Jure systems, such as Blockchain Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs).

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

2 major / 2 minor

Summary. The paper models social choice functions (SCFs) that aggregate votes on their own potential replacement, where agents vote according to ex-ante beliefs over whether decisions are better handled by the incumbent SCF or a suggested alternative. An SCF is self-maintaining if no replacement occurs under the induced dynamics. The central results are: (i) under i.i.d. unbiased beliefs, arbitrary tie-breaking, and general Boolean SCFs, only dictatorships are self-maintaining and every other SCF admits a finite path of replacements leading to a dictatorship (an Arrow-style theorem for dynamics); (ii) under pessimistic beliefs, status-quo-favoring tie-breaking, and weighted majority games (WMGs), the self-maintaining rules are exactly those whose minimal winning coalitions have size at most 2. Two extensions (forward-looking voters; wisdom-of-the-crowd utility) are shown to enlarge the set of self-maintaining, less-centralized SCFs. The framework is motivated by formal constitutions such as blockchain DAOs.

Significance. If the derivations hold, the paper supplies a clean dynamic model of constitutional stability that directly links belief assumptions and tie-breaking rules to the emergence or persistence of centralization. The explicit Arrow-style result under i.i.d. unbiased beliefs and the tight characterization for WMGs are parameter-free within the stated domain and therefore falsifiable in principle. The extensions illustrate how modest changes in voter foresight or aggregation externalities can stabilize decentralization, offering a useful template for institutional design in formal systems.

major comments (2)
  1. [i.i.d. unbiased case] i.i.d. unbiased case (Arrow-style theorem): the claim that every non-dictatorship admits a replacement path to dictatorship is stated for arbitrary Boolean functions and arbitrary tie-breaking, yet the manuscript provides no explicit construction or inductive step showing how the ex-ante-belief aggregation produces the next SCF in the path; a concrete two- or three-agent example would confirm the argument does not tacitly rely on anonymity or neutrality.
  2. [pessimistic approach] Pessimistic WMG characterization: the statement that self-maintaining rules are exactly the WMGs whose minimal winning coalitions have size ≤2 is tight only under status-quo tie-breaking; the manuscript should verify that the same coalition-size bound continues to characterize stability when the tie-breaking rule is altered or when the domain is restricted to anonymous SCFs.
minor comments (2)
  1. [Abstract] The acronym WMG is introduced without expansion in the abstract and early sections; spell out 'weighted majority game' on first use.
  2. [Extensions] The two extensions (forward-looking voters; wisdom-of-the-crowd effects) are described qualitatively; a short table comparing the sets of self-maintaining SCFs across the base model and each extension would improve readability.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

2 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for the careful reading and constructive suggestions. We address each major comment below and will revise the manuscript to incorporate the requested clarifications and examples.

read point-by-point responses

  1. Referee: [i.i.d. unbiased case] i.i.d. unbiased case (Arrow-style theorem): the claim that every non-dictatorship admits a replacement path to dictatorship is stated for arbitrary Boolean functions and arbitrary tie-breaking, yet the manuscript provides no explicit construction or inductive step showing how the ex-ante-belief aggregation produces the next SCF in the path; a concrete two- or three-agent example would confirm the argument does not tacitly rely on anonymity or neutrality.

    Authors: We agree that an explicit example will improve transparency. The proof proceeds by constructing, for any non-dictatorial Boolean SCF, a profile of i.i.d. unbiased beliefs under which a decisive coalition votes to replace it with a dictatorship (or an intermediate SCF with strictly smaller support). In the revision we will insert a self-contained three-agent example with a specific non-dictatorial SCF, arbitrary tie-breaking, and the induced belief profile that produces the first replacement step, followed by the terminal step to dictatorship. This will confirm that the argument relies only on the stated assumptions and does not invoke anonymity or neutrality. revision: yes

  2. Referee: [pessimistic approach] Pessimistic WMG characterization: the statement that self-maintaining rules are exactly the WMGs whose minimal winning coalitions have size ≤2 is tight only under status-quo tie-breaking; the manuscript should verify that the same coalition-size bound continues to characterize stability when the tie-breaking rule is altered or when the domain is restricted to anonymous SCFs.

    Authors: The theorem is stated for status-quo-favoring tie-breaking, which is the maintained assumption throughout that section. Under random tie-breaking the bound fails to characterize stability (larger minimal winning coalitions can become self-maintaining). We will add a short remark and a counter-example illustrating this change. For the anonymous subdomain the same size-≤2 bound continues to hold, because every anonymous WMG is a special case of the general WMGs already covered; we will note this explicitly in the revision. revision: partial

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No significant circularity; derivation self-contained from explicit definitions

full rationale

The paper defines self-maintenance directly from ex-ante agent beliefs over SCF replacement and the aggregation rule of the incumbent SCF. The Arrow-style theorem for the i.i.d. unbiased case is then proved by constructing explicit replacement paths for non-dictatorial Boolean SCFs that terminate at dictatorship, using only the stated tie-breaking rules and the belief model. No parameter is fitted to data and then relabeled as a prediction, no uniqueness theorem is imported from the authors' prior work, and no ansatz is smuggled via self-citation. The central result follows from the model equations without reduction to its own inputs by construction. Minor citations to Barbera-Jackson and Koray are external and non-load-bearing.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

1 free parameters · 2 axioms · 0 invented entities

The model rests on standard social choice assumptions about voter behavior and aggregation, with no free parameters fitted to data and no new invented entities postulated.

free parameters (1)
  • tie-breaking rule
    Specified differently across cases (arbitrary or status-quo preferring) but not fitted to empirical data.
axioms (2)
  • domain assumption Agents vote according to ex-ante beliefs about decisions and preference for incumbent versus replacement SCF.
    Core modeling choice for how votes are cast in the replacement decision.
  • standard math The incumbent SCF aggregates votes to decide on its own replacement.
    Standard definition of social choice function application.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5648 in / 1450 out tokens · 30952 ms · 2026-05-16T19:47:04.826242+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.

Lean theorems connected to this paper

Citations machine-checked in the Pith Canon. Every link opens the source theorem in the public Lean library.

What do these tags mean?
matches
The paper's claim is directly supported by a theorem in the formal canon.
supports
The theorem supports part of the paper's argument, but the paper may add assumptions or extra steps.
extends
The paper goes beyond the formal theorem; the theorem is a base layer rather than the whole result.
uses
The paper appears to rely on the theorem as machinery.
contradicts
The paper's claim conflicts with a theorem or certificate in the canon.
unclear
Pith found a possible connection, but the passage is too broad, indirect, or ambiguous to say the theorem truly supports the claim.

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

54 extracted references · 54 canonical work pages

  1. [1]

    Acemoglu and J

    D. Acemoglu and J. A. Robinson. A theory of political transitions.American Economic Review, 91(4):938–963, 2001

    work page 2001

  2. [2]

    K. J. Arrow. A difficulty in the concept of social welfare.Journal of political economy, 58(4): 328–346, 1950

    work page 1950

  3. [4]

    Austgen, A

    J. Austgen, A. Fábrega, S. Allen, K. Babel, M. Kelkar, and A. Juels. Dao decentralization: Voting-bloc entropy, bribery, and dark daos, 2023. URLhttps://arxiv.org/abs/2311.03530

    work page arXiv 2023

  4. [5]

    Azrieli and S

    Y. Azrieli and S. Kim. On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules.Games and Economic Behavior, 100:376–389, 2016. ISSN 0899-8256. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.010. URL https://www.sciencedirect. com/science/article/pii/S0899825616301257

    work page doi:10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.010 2016

  5. [6]

    Bahrani, P

    M. Bahrani, P. Garimidi, and T. Roughgarden. When Bidders Are DAOs. In J. Bonneau and S. M. Weinberg, editors,5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023), volume 282 ofLeibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), pages 21:1–21:21, Dagstuhl, Germany, 2023. Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik. ISBN 978-3- 9597...

    work page doi:10.4230/lipics.aft.2023.21 2023

  6. [7]

    Bahrani, P

    M. Bahrani, P. Garimidi, and T. Roughgarden. Centralization in block-building and proposer- builder separation. In J. Clark and E. Shi, editors,Financial Cryptography and Data Security, pages 331–349, Cham, 2025. Springer Nature Switzerland. ISBN 978-3-031-78676-1

    work page 2025

  7. [8]

    Balietti, P

    S. Balietti, P. Saggese, S. Kitzler, and B. Haslhofer. Slaying the dragon: The quest for democracy in decentralized autonomous organizations (daos), 2025. URLhttps://arxiv.org/abs/2511. 09263

    work page 2025

  8. [9]

    Barbera and M

    S. Barbera and M. O. Jackson. Choosing how to choose: Self-stable majority rules and constitutions.The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(3):1011–1048, 2004

    work page 2004

  9. [10]

    Barbereau, R

    T. Barbereau, R. Smethurst, O. Papageorgiou, J. Sedlmeir, and G. Fridgen. Decentralised finance’s timocratic governance: The distribution and exercise of tokenised voting rights.Tech- nology in Society, 73:102251, 2023

    work page 2023

  10. [11]

    Bergemann and S

    D. Bergemann and S. Morris. Robust mechanism design.Econometrica, 73(6):1771–1813, 2005. ISSN 00129682, 14680262. URLhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/3598751

    work page arXiv 2005

  11. [12]

    B. D. Bernheim. Rationalizable strategic behavior.Econometrica, 52(4):1007–1028, 1984. ISSN 00129682, 14680262. URLhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1911196

    work page arXiv 1984

  12. [13]

    V. N. Brovkin.The Mensheviks after October: Socialist Opposition and the Rise of the Bolshevik Dictatorship. Cornell University Press, 1987

    work page 1987

  13. [14]

    Caragiannis, D

    I. Caragiannis, D. Kurokawa, H. Moulin, A. D. Procaccia, N. Shah, and J. Wang. The unreasonable fairness of maximum nash welfare.ACM Trans. Econ. Comput., 7(3), Sept. 2019. ISSN 2167-8375. https://doi.org/10.1145/3355902. URLhttps://doi.org/10.1145/3355902

    work page doi:10.1145/3355902 2019

  14. [15]

    Chemaya, A

    N. Chemaya, A. Yaish, S. Yacouel, D. Malkhi, and L. W. Cong. Quantifying inequality in blockchain networks.Available at SSRN 5540258, 2025

    work page 2025

  15. [16]

    CHENOWETH and M

    E. CHENOWETH and M. J. STEPHAN.Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. Columbia University Press, 2011. URLhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/ 10.7312/chen15682

    work page doi:10.7312/chen15682 2011

  16. [17]

    L. W. Cong, D. Rabetti, C. C. Wang, and Y. Yan. Centralized governance in decentralized organizations.Available at SSRN 5168660, 2025

    work page 2025

  17. [18]

    Articles of confederation and perpetual union

    Continental Congress. Articles of confederation and perpetual union. National Archives and Records Administration, 1777. URLhttps://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/ articles-of-confederation. Adopted November 15, 1777; ratified March 1, 1781

    work page

  18. [19]

    Craig and G

    P. Craig and G. De Búrca.EU law: text, cases, and materials. Oxford University Press, USA, 2011

    work page 2011

  19. [20]

    de Condorcet.Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix

    M. de Condorcet.Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix. Imprimerie Royale, Paris, 1785. URLhttps://archive.org/details/bub_ gb_RzAVAAAAQAAJ

    work page

  20. [21]

    Deepdao page for oceandao, 2025

    DeepDAO. Deepdao page for oceandao, 2025. Accessed: 2025-12-25

    work page 2025

  21. [22]

    Doyle.The Oxford history of the French revolution

    W. Doyle.The Oxford history of the French revolution. Oxford University Press, 2018

    work page 2018

  22. [23]

    D. Estlund. Epistemic proceduralism and democratic authority. InDoes Truth Matter? Democracy and Public Space, pages 15–27. Springer, 2009

    work page 2009

  23. [24]

    Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community — Article 1, point 56 (Article 48 TEU)

    European Union. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community — Article 1, point 56 (Article 48 TEU). Official Journal of the European Union, C 306, 2007. URL https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12007L%2FTXT

    work page 2007

  24. [25]

    Consolidated version of the treaty on european union — Article 48, 2016

    European Union. Consolidated version of the treaty on european union — Article 48, 2016. URL http://data.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2016/art_48/oj. The article detailing the ordinary and simplified revision procedures

    work page 2016

  25. [26]

    Fabrega, A

    A. Fabrega, A. Zhao, J. Yu, J. Austgen, S. Allen, K. Babel, M. Kelkar, and A. Juels. Voting-Bloc entropy: A new metric for DAO decentralization. In34th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 25), pages 1299–1318, Seattle, WA, 2025. USENIX Association. ISBN 978-1-939133-52-

    work page 2025

  26. [27]

    URL https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity25/presentation/fabrega- entropy

    work page

  27. [28]

    B. Falk, T. Pathan, A. Rigas, and G. Tsoukalas. Blockchain governance: an empirical analysis of user engagement on daos.arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.10945, 2024

    work page arXiv 2024

  28. [29]

    T. J. Feddersen and W. Pesendorfer. The swing voter’s curse.The American Economic Review, 86(3):408–424, 1996. ISSN 00028282. URLhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2118204

    work page arXiv 1996

  29. [30]

    Feichtinger, R

    R. Feichtinger, R. Fritsch, L. Heimbach, Y. Vonlanthen, and R. Wattenhofer. SoK: Attacks on DAOs. In R. Böhme and L. Kiffer, editors,6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024), volume 316 ofLeibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), pages 28:1–28:27, Dagstuhl, Germany, 2024. Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Infor...

    work page doi:10.4230/lipics.aft.2024.28 2024

  30. [31]

    Fritsch and R

    R. Fritsch and R. Wattenhofer. The price of majority support.arXiv preprint arXiv:2201.12303, 2022

    work page arXiv 2022

  31. [32]

    Fritsch, M

    R. Fritsch, M. Müller, and R. Wattenhofer. Analyzing voting power in decentralized gov- ernance: Who controls daos?Blockchain: Research and Applications, 5(3):100208, 2024. ISSN 2096-7209. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bcra.2024.100208. URL https: //www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2096720924000216

    work page doi:10.1016/j.bcra.2024.100208 2024

  32. [33]

    Gafni and B

    Y. Gafni and B. Golan. Beyond proportional individual guarantees for binary perpetual voting,

    work page

  33. [34]

    URLhttps://arxiv.org/abs/2408.08767

    work page arXiv

  34. [35]

    Gibbon.The history of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, volume 1

    E. Gibbon.The history of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, volume 1. Harper, 1833

    work page

  35. [36]

    Goldstein, D

    I. Goldstein, D. Gupta, and R. Sverchov. Utility tokens as a commitment to competition.The Journal of Finance, 79(6):4197–4246, 2024. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13389. URLhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jofi.13389

    work page doi:10.1111/jofi.13389 2024

  36. [37]

    Hermida-Rivera

    H. Hermida-Rivera. Minimal stable voting rules.Games and Economic Behavior, 153:541– 553, 2025. ISSN 0899-8256. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.006. URL https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825625000995

    work page doi:10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.006 2025

  37. [38]

    Hermida-Rivera and T

    H. Hermida-Rivera and T. T. Kerman. Binary self-selective voting rules.Journal of Public Economic Theory, 27(3):e70039, 2025. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70039. URL https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jpet.70039

    work page doi:10.1111/jpet.70039 2025

  38. [39]

    Kaneko and K

    M. Kaneko and K. Nakamura. The nash social welfare function.Econometrica, 47(2):423–435,

    work page

  39. [40]

    URLhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1914191

    ISSN 00129682, 14680262. URLhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1914191

    work page arXiv

  40. [41]

    Kitzler, S

    S. Kitzler, S. Balietti, P. Saggese, B. Haslhofer, and M. Strohmaier. The governance of decentralized autonomous organizations: A study of contributors’ influence, networks, and shifts in voting power. In J. Clark and E. Shi, editors,Financial Cryptography and Data Security, pages 313–330, Cham, 2025. Springer Nature Switzerland. ISBN 978-3-031-78679-2

    work page 2025

  41. [42]

    S. Koray. Self-selective social choice functions verify arrow and gibbard-satterthwaite theorems. Econometrica, 68(4):981–996, 2000

    work page 2000

  42. [43]

    A. Levy, S. M. Weinberg, and C. Zhou. Analyzing the economic impact of decentralization on users.arXiv preprint arXiv:2512.11739, 2025

    work page arXiv 2025

  43. [44]

    Li and W

    J. Li and W. Mann. Digital tokens and platform building.The Review of Financial Studies, 38 (7):1921–1954, 2025

    work page 1921

  44. [45]

    Lord et al.Aristotle’s politics

    C. Lord et al.Aristotle’s politics. University of Chicago Press, 2013

    work page 2013

  45. [46]

    B. C. McGing.Polybius’ Histories. Oxford University Press, 2010

    work page 2010

  46. [47]

    R. Meir. Tyranny of the minority in social choice: a call to arms. InProceedings of the 24th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pages 2865–2869, 2025

    work page 2025

  47. [48]

    An extension of HybridSynchAADL and its application to collaborating au- tonomous UA Vs

    C. Ovezik, D. Karakostas, M. Milad, D. W. Woods, and A. Kiayias. Sok: Measuring blockchain decentralization. InApplied Cryptography and Network Security: 23rd International Conference, ACNS 2025, Munich, Germany, June 23–26, 2025, Proceedings, Part I, page 184–214, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2025. Springer-Verlag. ISBN 978-3-031-95760-4. https://doi.org/10.1007/...

    work page doi:10.1007/978-3-031- 2025

  48. [49]

    D. G. Pearce. Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection.Econometrica, 52 (4):1029–1050, 1984. ISSN 00129682, 14680262. URLhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1911197

    work page arXiv 1984

  49. [50]

    C. D. Reeve et al. Plato: Republic.Hackett, Indianapolis, 2004

    work page 2004

  50. [51]

    M. Reuter. Platform Precommitment via Decentralization.IMF Working Papers, 2024(028):1, 2 2024. ISSN 1018-5941. https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400267284.001. URLhttp://dx.doi. org/10.5089/9798400267284.001

    work page doi:10.5089/9798400267284.001 2024

  51. [52]

    Shakespeare.King lear, volume 5

    W. Shakespeare.King lear, volume 5. Classic Books Company, 2001

    work page 2001

  52. [53]

    Socking and W

    M. Socking and W. Xiong. Decentralization through tokenization.The Journal of Fi- nance, 78(1):247–299, 2023. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13192. URLhttps: //onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jofi.13192

    work page doi:10.1111/jofi.13192 2023

  53. [54]

    Constitution

    U.S. Constitution. Constitution of the united states. National Archives and Records Ad- ministration, 1787. URL https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution. Signed September 17, 1787; effective March 4, 1789

    work page

  54. [55]

    first approximation

    A. Yaish, N. Chemaya, D. Malkhi, and L. W. Cong. Inequality in the age of pseudonymity. In Proceedings of the Fortieth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Fortieth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence and Eighteenth Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, AAAI’26/IAAI’26/EAAI’26. AAAI Press, 202...

    work page 2026