Only dictatorships are self-maintaining under i.i.d. unbiased beliefs with arbitrary tie-breaking, while rules with minimal winning coalitions of size at most 2 are stable under pessimistic beliefs and status-quo tie-breaking.
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Proposes SVD-based reduction of multi-dimensional matching to 1D problem for O(N log N) computation that approximates Nash Social Welfare under low effective dimensionality.
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Centralization and Stability in Formal Constitutions
Only dictatorships are self-maintaining under i.i.d. unbiased beliefs with arbitrary tie-breaking, while rules with minimal winning coalitions of size at most 2 are stable under pessimistic beliefs and status-quo tie-breaking.
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Multi-Dimensional Matching in Market Design
Proposes SVD-based reduction of multi-dimensional matching to 1D problem for O(N log N) computation that approximates Nash Social Welfare under low effective dimensionality.