Only dictatorships are self-maintaining under i.i.d. unbiased beliefs with arbitrary tie-breaking, while rules with minimal winning coalitions of size at most 2 are stable under pessimistic beliefs and status-quo tie-breaking.
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4 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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UNVERDICTED 4representative citing papers
Existence of EF1 and constant-ρ MMS allocations proven for submodular valuations.
Simpler poly-time constructions for EF2X/EF3X and improved √2/2-EFX and 2/3-EFX approximations for monotone and additive valuations in restricted hypergraphs.
Proposes SVD-based reduction of multi-dimensional matching to 1D problem for O(N log N) computation that approximates Nash Social Welfare under low effective dimensionality.
citing papers explorer
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Simultaneous EF1 and approximate MMS allocations for submodular valuations
Existence of EF1 and constant-ρ MMS allocations proven for submodular valuations.
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Almost EFX in Hypergraphs
Simpler poly-time constructions for EF2X/EF3X and improved √2/2-EFX and 2/3-EFX approximations for monotone and additive valuations in restricted hypergraphs.
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Multi-Dimensional Matching in Market Design
Proposes SVD-based reduction of multi-dimensional matching to 1D problem for O(N log N) computation that approximates Nash Social Welfare under low effective dimensionality.