Boundary mixed steady states in networked evolutionary games are characterized by boundary Nash equilibria in two-strategy cases and are generically unstable unless degenerate due to interaction structure among mixed players.
Nature 441, 502–5 (2006)
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On the Structure and Stability of Boundary Mixed Steady States in Evolutionary Games on Networks
Boundary mixed steady states in networked evolutionary games are characterized by boundary Nash equilibria in two-strategy cases and are generically unstable unless degenerate due to interaction structure among mixed players.