In the nonlinear voter model, evolutionary games, and the partisan voter model, one-sided zealotry enforces consensus in infinite populations only if the social impact function grows at least linearly (q>=1); sublinear impact keeps consensus unstable.
We focus again on f (x) =xq, noting that q-deformed evolutionary dynamics without zealots were pre- viously studied in Ref
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Breaking coexistence: Zealotry vs. nonlinear social impact
In the nonlinear voter model, evolutionary games, and the partisan voter model, one-sided zealotry enforces consensus in infinite populations only if the social impact function grows at least linearly (q>=1); sublinear impact keeps consensus unstable.