Develops a robust information design framework for Bayesian congestion games that guarantees obedience to recommendations across a range of belief perturbations around a nominal prior.
A class of games possessing pure-strategy nash equilibria,
2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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A hierarchical non-monetary control framework for autonomous intersections formulates traffic routing as a congestion game with path-dependent node costs, proves existence and essential uniqueness of equilibria, and reduces the user-equilibrium to system-optimal efficiency gap by up to 71% on the Si
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Robust Information Design with Heterogeneous Beliefs in Bayesian Congestion Games
Develops a robust information design framework for Bayesian congestion games that guarantees obedience to recommendations across a range of belief perturbations around a nominal prior.
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Controlling Traffic without Tolls: A Non-Monetary Framework for Autonomous Intersections
A hierarchical non-monetary control framework for autonomous intersections formulates traffic routing as a congestion game with path-dependent node costs, proves existence and essential uniqueness of equilibria, and reduces the user-equilibrium to system-optimal efficiency gap by up to 71% on the Si