In a quadratic Bayesian persuasion model with network coordination, the optimal public signal always discloses the average state and, under a uniform synergy graph, discloses Laplacian-eigenvector statistics passing a beta threshold.
LQG Information Design
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abstract
This paper addresses information design in a workhorse model of network games, where agents have linear best responses, the information designer maximizes a quadratic objective, and the payoff-relevant state follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution. We formulate the problem as a semidefinite program and establish strong duality to characterize the optimal information structure. A necessary and sufficient condition for optimality is given by a simple linear relationship between the induced equilibrium strategy profile and the state. Leveraging this characterization, we show that the state is fully revealed in an aggregative form for welfare maximization, while individual agents may remain only partially informed. When agent roles are interchangeable, the optimal information structure inherits the same degree of symmetry, which facilitates computation. In such cases, we show that the optimal amount of information revealed to each agent is closely linked to the network's chromatic number.
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2025 1verdicts
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Information Design for Adaptive Organizations
In a quadratic Bayesian persuasion model with network coordination, the optimal public signal always discloses the average state and, under a uniform synergy graph, discloses Laplacian-eigenvector statistics passing a beta threshold.