Proposes the first budget-feasible truthful mechanism with approximation guarantees for submodular welfare maximization in procurement auctions, plus an improved deterministic mechanism for valuation maximization.
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Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Submodular Welfare Maximization in Procurement Auctions
Proposes the first budget-feasible truthful mechanism with approximation guarantees for submodular welfare maximization in procurement auctions, plus an improved deterministic mechanism for valuation maximization.