Proves CLS-hardness for Nash equilibrium computation in two-team polymatrix games with zero-sum or coordination pairwise payoffs, with tight CLS membership when one team has independent adversaries, plus an ε-Nash algorithm with 1/ε² runtime dependence.
Non-cooperative games
4 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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The authors characterize a new Borda-type social ranking solution (SRS) that satisfies weak consistency, closeness to unanimity under linear symmetric domains, neutrality, and independence of perfunctory participation.
Sublevel sets of invex functions are connected under mild assumptions, with the result extended to solution sets in invex-incave minimax problems and incave games.
Analytical derivation of policy-gradient dynamics with partner selection proves population variance is necessary for cooperation emergence and identifies a sufficient condition for cooperation-promoting populations via a stochastic Wiener process model.
citing papers explorer
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The Complexity of Two-Team Polymatrix Games with Independent Adversaries
Proves CLS-hardness for Nash equilibrium computation in two-team polymatrix games with zero-sum or coordination pairwise payoffs, with tight CLS membership when one team has independent adversaries, plus an ε-Nash algorithm with 1/ε² runtime dependence.
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Consistency, unanimity, and the Borda rule in social ranking
The authors characterize a new Borda-type social ranking solution (SRS) that satisfies weak consistency, closeness to unanimity under linear symmetric domains, neutrality, and independence of perfunctory participation.
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On the Connectedness of Sublevel Sets in Invex Optimization
Sublevel sets of invex functions are connected under mild assumptions, with the result extended to solution sets in invex-incave minimax problems and incave games.
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The Dynamics of Policy Gradient in Social Dilemmas with Partner Selection
Analytical derivation of policy-gradient dynamics with partner selection proves population variance is necessary for cooperation emergence and identifies a sufficient condition for cooperation-promoting populations via a stochastic Wiener process model.