The paper delivers a deterministic O(N) characterization of Nash equilibria in directed-cycle binary graphical games under a robust incentive structure, using parity conditions for pure equilibria and induced indifference for the mixed case.
[NBP20] Sai Ganesh Nagarajan, David Balduzzi, and Georgios Piliouras
6 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
6
Pith papers citing it
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UNVERDICTED 6representative citing papers
Partner selection alters opponent distributions in policy-gradient dynamics, promoting cooperation when population variance exists, with a Wiener-process stochastic extension proving a sufficient condition and stationary distribution.
Proves CLS-hardness for Nash equilibrium computation in two-team polymatrix games with zero-sum or coordination pairwise payoffs, with tight CLS membership when one team has independent adversaries, plus an ε-Nash algorithm with 1/ε² runtime dependence.
Tool-using LLM agents can implement undetectable stegosystems, shifting the primary barrier to covert multi-agent collusion from technical feasibility to coordination without explicit agreement.
The authors characterize a new Borda-type social ranking solution (SRS) that satisfies weak consistency, closeness to unanimity under linear symmetric domains, neutrality, and independence of perfunctory participation.
Sublevel sets of invex functions are connected under mild assumptions, with the result extended to solution sets in invex-incave minimax problems and incave games.
citing papers explorer
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N-Player Binary Games with Unidirectional Dependencies: Cycle Robustness and Induced Indifference
The paper delivers a deterministic O(N) characterization of Nash equilibria in directed-cycle binary graphical games under a robust incentive structure, using parity conditions for pure equilibria and induced indifference for the mixed case.
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The Dynamics of Policy Gradient in Social Dilemmas with Partner Selection
Partner selection alters opponent distributions in policy-gradient dynamics, promoting cooperation when population variance exists, with a Wiener-process stochastic extension proving a sufficient condition and stationary distribution.
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The Complexity of Two-Team Polymatrix Games with Independent Adversaries
Proves CLS-hardness for Nash equilibrium computation in two-team polymatrix games with zero-sum or coordination pairwise payoffs, with tight CLS membership when one team has independent adversaries, plus an ε-Nash algorithm with 1/ε² runtime dependence.
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Tool Use Enables Undetectable Steganography in Multi-Agent LLM Systems
Tool-using LLM agents can implement undetectable stegosystems, shifting the primary barrier to covert multi-agent collusion from technical feasibility to coordination without explicit agreement.
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Consistency, unanimity, and the Borda rule in social ranking
The authors characterize a new Borda-type social ranking solution (SRS) that satisfies weak consistency, closeness to unanimity under linear symmetric domains, neutrality, and independence of perfunctory participation.
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On the Connectedness of Sublevel Sets in Invex Optimization
Sublevel sets of invex functions are connected under mild assumptions, with the result extended to solution sets in invex-incave minimax problems and incave games.