A quality-preserving auction framework for LLM advertising uses RAG-based endogenous reserves and KL-regularized or screened VCG mechanisms to achieve DSIC, IR, higher revenue, and better semantic fidelity than baselines.
Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders.The Journal of Finance, 16(1):8–37
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Mechanism Design for Quality-Preserving LLM Advertising
A quality-preserving auction framework for LLM advertising uses RAG-based endogenous reserves and KL-regularized or screened VCG mechanisms to achieve DSIC, IR, higher revenue, and better semantic fidelity than baselines.