Equation-to-Behavior Prompting lets large LLMs match cognitive models like Bayesian updating in persuasion games; RL training cuts small-model belief error by 26.5% and improves diverse training outcomes by 2.5-12%.
Strategic Information Transmis- sion
5 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
5
Pith papers citing it
citation-role summary
background 1
citation-polarity summary
years
2026 5roles
background 1polarities
background 1representative citing papers
Non-affine approval functions create unavoidable miscalibration in proper scoring rules for strategic agents, but step-function thresholds enable first-best screening without it, uniquely for the Brier score.
Strategic agents can achieve high-harm outcomes via low-capacity channels by concentrating residual capacity on high-impact predicates of confidential data, so leakage bounds need not bound worst-case harm.
Individual adaptive delegation-verification strategies aggregate via three extrapolation principles into sociotechnical lock-in modeled as a prisoner's dilemma that degrades epistemic standards unless mitigated by communicative standards and institutional norms.
citing papers explorer
-
Using Cognitive Models to Improve Language Model Simulation of Human Persuasion Games
Equation-to-Behavior Prompting lets large LLMs match cognitive models like Bayesian updating in persuasion games; RL training cuts small-model belief error by 26.5% and improves diverse training outcomes by 2.5-12%.
-
The Endogeneity of Miscalibration: Impossibility and Escape in Scored Reporting
Non-affine approval functions create unavoidable miscalibration in proper scoring rules for strategic agents, but step-function thresholds enable first-best screening without it, uniquely for the Brier score.
-
A Note on the Strategic Confinement Problem
Strategic agents can achieve high-harm outcomes via low-capacity channels by concentrating residual capacity on high-impact predicates of confidential data, so leakage bounds need not bound worst-case harm.
-
The Human-AI Delegation-Verification Dilemma: Individual Strategies, Collective Equilibria and Sociotechnical Lock-in
Individual adaptive delegation-verification strategies aggregate via three extrapolation principles into sociotechnical lock-in modeled as a prisoner's dilemma that degrades epistemic standards unless mitigated by communicative standards and institutional norms.