A profit sharing mechanism using a two-stage prescheduling and rescheduling process with bilevel modeling coordinates TNO and DNO to minimize PDN costs while benefiting both in a 12-node traffic and 18-bus power network simulation.
Coordinating urban power-traffic networks: a subsidy-based Nash–Stackelberg– Nash game model,
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A Profit Sharing Mechanism for Coordinated Power Traffic System
A profit sharing mechanism using a two-stage prescheduling and rescheduling process with bilevel modeling coordinates TNO and DNO to minimize PDN costs while benefiting both in a 12-node traffic and 18-bus power network simulation.