Competition lowers the frequency of suboptimal bonus contract choices by U.S. auto dealers, but mistakes persist even in competitive markets via within-dealer behavioral shifts.
Title resolution pending
2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
2
Pith papers citing it
verdicts
UNVERDICTED 2representative citing papers
Identifies a sufficient and necessary condition on signal distributions ensuring optimal cutoff incentive contracts exist in a continuous-state information acquisition model.
citing papers explorer
-
Competition and Anomalies Redux: Evidence from U.S. Auto Dealers
Competition lowers the frequency of suboptimal bonus contract choices by U.S. auto dealers, but mistakes persist even in competitive markets via within-dealer behavioral shifts.
-
Incentivizing Information Acquisition
Identifies a sufficient and necessary condition on signal distributions ensuring optimal cutoff incentive contracts exist in a continuous-state information acquisition model.