Babel is an efficient black-box jailbreaking framework that formalizes sparse safety attention heads via a mathematical obfuscation model and uses iterative distribution refinement to achieve higher attack success rates on models like GPT-4o and Claude-3-5-haiku with around 40 queries.
arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.14144 , year=
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Suppressing one refusal neuron or amplifying one concept neuron bypasses safety alignment in LLMs from 1.7B to 70B parameters without training or prompt engineering.
Causal mediation analysis shows harmful LLM outputs arise in late layers from MLP failures and gating neurons, with early layers handling harm context detection and signal propagation.
Sparse autoencoders plus greedy filtering and factorization-machine interaction modeling identify minimal sets of features in Gemma-2-2B-IT and LLaMA-3.1-8B-IT whose ablation produces jailbreaks by flipping refusal to compliance.
SAP locates safety-correlated directions via contrastive signals and perturbs hidden-state propagation with a lightweight probe to preserve safety while fine-tuning LLMs for task performance.
citing papers explorer
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Babel: Jailbreaking Safety Attention via Obfuscation Distribution Optimized Sampling
Babel is an efficient black-box jailbreaking framework that formalizes sparse safety attention heads via a mathematical obfuscation model and uses iterative distribution refinement to achieve higher attack success rates on models like GPT-4o and Claude-3-5-haiku with around 40 queries.
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A Single Neuron Is Sufficient to Bypass Safety Alignment in Large Language Models
Suppressing one refusal neuron or amplifying one concept neuron bypasses safety alignment in LLMs from 1.7B to 70B parameters without training or prompt engineering.
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Why Do Large Language Models Generate Harmful Content?
Causal mediation analysis shows harmful LLM outputs arise in late layers from MLP failures and gating neurons, with early layers handling harm context detection and signal propagation.
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Beyond I'm Sorry, I Can't: Dissecting Large Language Model Refusal
Sparse autoencoders plus greedy filtering and factorization-machine interaction modeling identify minimal sets of features in Gemma-2-2B-IT and LLaMA-3.1-8B-IT whose ablation produces jailbreaks by flipping refusal to compliance.
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Secure LLM Fine-Tuning via Safety-Aware Probing
SAP locates safety-correlated directions via contrastive signals and perturbs hidden-state propagation with a lightweight probe to preserve safety while fine-tuning LLMs for task performance.