In the nonlinear voter model, evolutionary games, and the partisan voter model, one-sided zealotry enforces consensus in infinite populations only if the social impact function grows at least linearly (q>=1); sublinear impact keeps consensus unstable.
Thus, for any q < 1 we find f ′(x) → +∞ for x ↓ 0
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Breaking coexistence: Zealotry vs. nonlinear social impact
In the nonlinear voter model, evolutionary games, and the partisan voter model, one-sided zealotry enforces consensus in infinite populations only if the social impact function grows at least linearly (q>=1); sublinear impact keeps consensus unstable.