In the nonlinear voter model, evolutionary games, and the partisan voter model, one-sided zealotry enforces consensus in infinite populations only if the social impact function grows at least linearly (q>=1); sublinear impact keeps consensus unstable.
(6)] with one-sided zealots as follows, dx dt = (1 − x − z) f (x + z) − x f(1 − x − z), (29) where f (x) is the social impact function
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Breaking coexistence: Zealotry vs. nonlinear social impact
In the nonlinear voter model, evolutionary games, and the partisan voter model, one-sided zealotry enforces consensus in infinite populations only if the social impact function grows at least linearly (q>=1); sublinear impact keeps consensus unstable.