Existence and uniqueness of continuous and monotone Bayesian Nash equilibria are established simultaneously via the Banach fixed-point theorem, with additional stability results under perturbations of the type distribution.
Single crossing properties and the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games of incomplete information.Econometrica, 69(4):861–889, 2001
2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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Proves existence and uniqueness of BNE in first-price auctions with discrete value distributions and provides a computation algorithm that avoids ODEs.
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Existence and Uniqueness Theorem of Continuous and Monotone Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Stability Analysis
Existence and uniqueness of continuous and monotone Bayesian Nash equilibria are established simultaneously via the Banach fixed-point theorem, with additional stability results under perturbations of the type distribution.
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Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in First-Price Auction with Discrete Value Distributions
Proves existence and uniqueness of BNE in first-price auctions with discrete value distributions and provides a computation algorithm that avoids ODEs.