Existence and uniqueness of continuous and monotone Bayesian Nash equilibria are established simultaneously via the Banach fixed-point theorem, with additional stability results under perturbations of the type distribution.
Single crossing properties and the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games of incomplete information.Econometrica, 69(4):861–889
2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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Proves existence and uniqueness of BNE in first-price auctions with discrete value distributions and provides a computation algorithm that avoids ODEs.
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Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in First-Price Auction with Discrete Value Distributions
Proves existence and uniqueness of BNE in first-price auctions with discrete value distributions and provides a computation algorithm that avoids ODEs.