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Great, Now Write an Article About That: The Crescendo Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreak Attack

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abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs) have risen significantly in popularity and are increasingly being adopted across multiple applications. These LLMs are heavily aligned to resist engaging in illegal or unethical topics as a means to avoid contributing to responsible AI harms. However, a recent line of attacks, known as jailbreaks, seek to overcome this alignment. Intuitively, jailbreak attacks aim to narrow the gap between what the model can do and what it is willing to do. In this paper, we introduce a novel jailbreak attack called Crescendo. Unlike existing jailbreak methods, Crescendo is a simple multi-turn jailbreak that interacts with the model in a seemingly benign manner. It begins with a general prompt or question about the task at hand and then gradually escalates the dialogue by referencing the model's replies progressively leading to a successful jailbreak. We evaluate Crescendo on various public systems, including ChatGPT, Gemini Pro, Gemini-Ultra, LlaMA-2 70b and LlaMA-3 70b Chat, and Anthropic Chat. Our results demonstrate the strong efficacy of Crescendo, with it achieving high attack success rates across all evaluated models and tasks. Furthermore, we present Crescendomation, a tool that automates the Crescendo attack and demonstrate its efficacy against state-of-the-art models through our evaluations. Crescendomation surpasses other state-of-the-art jailbreaking techniques on the AdvBench subset dataset, achieving 29-61% higher performance on GPT-4 and 49-71% on Gemini-Pro. Finally, we also demonstrate Crescendo's ability to jailbreak multimodal models.

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representative citing papers

Redefining AI Red Teaming in the Agentic Era: From Weeks to Hours

cs.AI · 2026-05-05 · unverdicted · novelty 6.0

An agentic red teaming system automates creation of adversarial testing workflows from natural language goals, unifying ML and generative AI attacks and achieving 85% success rate on Meta Llama Scout with no custom human code.

Benchmarking Misuse Mitigation Against Covert Adversaries

cs.CR · 2025-06-06 · unverdicted · novelty 6.0

Develops the BSD data generation pipeline and two new datasets to evaluate decomposition attacks as effective misuse enablers and stateful defenses as a countermeasure in language model safety.

Multilingual jailbreaking of LLMs using low-resource languages

cs.CL · 2026-05-18 · unverdicted · novelty 5.0

Multi-turn prompts in Afrikaans, Kiswahili, isiXhosa and isiZulu achieve 52-83% harmful response rates across GPT, Claude, Gemini and others, rising further with native-speaker red-teaming, showing translation quality limits jailbreak success.

Activation-Guided Local Editing for Jailbreaking Attacks

cs.CR · 2025-08-01 · unverdicted · novelty 5.0

AGILE is a two-stage jailbreak attack that combines scenario-based rephrasing with activation-guided local editing to reach state-of-the-art attack success rates and strong black-box transferability.

Surviving the Unseen: Predictive Defense for Novel Multi-Turn Multimodal Attacks

cs.CR · 2026-05-18 · unverdicted · novelty 4.0

Proposes the TRIAD framework that treats multi-turn multimodal attacks as continuous trajectories and uses structural anomaly detection, regularized Mahalanobis distance, topological acceleration, and a time-varying Cox model with Bayesian HMM feedback to predict and bound expected time-to-failure.

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