Optimizing Scrip Systems: Efficiency, Crashes, Hoarders, and Altruists

We discuss the design of efficient scrip systems and develop tools for empirically analyzing them. For those interested in the empirical study of scrip systems, we demonstrate how characteristics of agents in a system can be inferred from the equilibrium distribution of money. From the perspective of a system designer, we examine the effect of the money supply on social welfare and show that social welfare is maximized by increasing the money supply up to the point that the system experiences a ``monetary crash,'' where money is sufficiently devalued that no agent is willing to perform a service. We also examine the implications of the presence of altruists and hoarders on the performance of the system. While a small number of altruists may improve social welfare, too many can also cause the system to experience a monetary crash, which may be bad for social welfare. Hoarders generally decrease social welfare but, surprisingly, they also promote system stability by helping prevent monetary crashes. In addition, we provide new technical tools for analyzing and computing equilibria by showing that our model exhibits strategic complementarities, which implies that there exist equilibria in pure strategies that can be computed efficiently.