A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium
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We present a direct reduction from k-player games to 2-player games that preserves approximate Nash equilibrium. Previously, the computational equivalence of computing approximate Nash equilibrium in k-player and 2-player games was established via an indirect reduction. This included a sequence of works defining the complexity class PPAD, identifying complete problems for this class, showing that computing approximate Nash equilibrium for k-player games is in PPAD, and reducing a PPAD-complete problem to computing approximate Nash equilibrium for 2-player games. Our direct reduction makes no use of the concept of PPAD, thus eliminating some of the difficulties involved in following the known indirect reduction.
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