Generalized roll-call model for the Shapley-Shubik index
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In 1996 Dan Felsenthal and Mosh\'e Machover considered the following model. An assembly consisting of $n$ voters exercises roll-call. All $n!$ possible orders in which the voters may be called are assumed to be equiprobable. The votes of each voter are independent with expectation $0<p<1$ for an individual vote {\lq\lq}yea{\rq\rq}. For a given decision rule $v$ the \emph{pivotal} voter in a roll-call is the one whose vote finally decides the aggregated outcome. It turned out that the probability to be pivotal is equivalent to the Shapley-Shubik index. Here we give an easy combinatorial proof of this coincidence, further weaken the assumptions of the underlying model, and study generalizations to the case of more than two alternatives.
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An Axiomatization of the Shapley-Shubik Index for Interval Decisions
An axiomatization is established for the Shapley-Shubik power index on interval decision games, with discrete versions arising as special cases.
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